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ABSTRACT
The following is an inquiry into the intellectual legacy of James W. Carey. This
study locates, classifies and critiques the three most salient currents of his work: (1) His
critique of the intellectual history of mass communications and the positivism of the
media “effects tradition”; (2) his North American cultural studies alternative to the
dominant ways of knowing in his discipline; (3) and his technological criticism. This
study finds that while Carey was neglectful is his analysis of institutions and issues of
political economy, the author argues for a continuation of the conversations that Carey
began with regards to the ways of knowing in the discipline of Journalism and Mass
Communications and his analysis of technology and culture.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
When James W. Carey died in 2006, the headline of his obituary in the New York
Times read “James W. Carey, Teacher of Journalists, Dies at 71.” It was a fitting tribute.
Carey was indeed an extraordinary teacher, not only of journalists but also of students
and fellow scholars, as evidenced in the many memorials and eulogies that appeared in
scholarly journals after his passing. But he was not simply a teacher. He was also a
communications theorist, historian, and philosopher. His work ranged widely across
disciplinary boundaries. Carey paid little attention to the various lines of departmental
demarcation and for the most part considered them to be arbitrary.1 While such
boundaries might be useful to higher education administrators in the ordinary business of
organizing students and allocating funds, for Carey, they served little purpose in
intellectual inquiry.
Carey dusted off old books to explore the relationship between media and culture,
and he borrowed from thinkers in other disciplines—like Innis, Geertz, and Dewey—and
synthesized their ideas for his own purposes.2 His Times obituary called his tastes
“eclectic,” but a more contemporary and academic term would be multidisciplinary.
1

This is not hyperbole. When asked about how he looked at disciplines, departments, and fields of study,
Carey responded, “[i]n a way, I don’t look at them, or I don’t care about them, or I think they are
insignificant.” Quoted in James Carey and Tom Reilly, “Putting the World at Peril: A Conversation with
James W. Carey,” in James Carey: A Critical Reader, eds. Eve Stryker Munson and Catherine A. Warren,
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), 102.
2

On Carey’s intellectual dexterity see G. Stuart Adam, “Jim Carey and the Problem of Journalism
Education,” Cultural Studies 23, no. 2 (2009): 157.

1

Unlike most of his fellow communication scholars during the early years of his career,
Carey did not think of himself as a social scientist. Rather, he sought to study the media
as a form of culture, as situated within culture, in the way that literary critics, historians,
philosophers, anthropologists, and others have sought to study other forms of cultural
expression, such as the novel or a Balinese cockfight. In other words, Carey wanted to
interpret the media; he wanted to dig for and articulate meaning in the communications
systems and media content that inhabited the world, both past and present.
Carey was interested in the relationships between people and media—how these
relationships are established and how they create and define communities. His major
contribution to the discipline of mass communication was his revaluation and critique of
the traditional view of the study of communication in the United States. This traditional
view, the “transmission view,” sees communication as a mechanistic process of sending
information through space. Carey’s approach to communication merged it with culture
such that the two become indistinguishable one from another. For Carey, to study
communication was to study human existence as expressed through its symbolic forms—
communication as culture. Carey derived his approach to communications from the
humanities in an effort to unearth deeper meanings and values in our symbolic
environment.
Carey managed to add intellectual depth and heft to the discipline while at the
same time eschewing the increasingly complex statistical research within the media
effects tradition that continues to dominate the field. Carey rejected the positivist
paradigm in communication research with its formally objective methods and reductionist
procedures; instead, he sought to investigate the values and meanings of mass
communication using older forms of philosophical and historical argument. He
2

introduced the term “cultural studies” as a term for his intellectual endeavor in 1963.3
This thesis is a study of James W. Carey’s scholarship and its contributions to the
“cultural turn” in communications research. The book Thinking with James Carey
provides a useful example as to the spirit of this thesis. In the introduction to this
collection of essays, the editors inform readers that their book does not intend to propose
that one think as James Carey, but rather with him4 or alongside him. With this idea as a
guiding principle, my analysis of Carey’s contributions to the study of communication
will use a methodological dialogism that will extend the conversation that Carey began
with a hermeneutic intent; 5 in other words, I plan to extend the conversation that Carey
began without the expectation of finding any final answers to the questions and issues
contained in his work. Instead, I wish to highlight what I find to be the most important
ideas in his thinking about the study of communication. This thesis will attempt to
examine the work of Carey as an “epistemic individual,” as Jonathan Sterne referred to
him—an author whose work has come to stand as a marker for a particular way of
knowing—by outlining his proposals for the cultural study of communication and

3

James W. Carey, “Reflections on the Project of (American) Cultural Studies,” in Cultural Studies in
Question, eds. Marjorie Ferguson and Peter Golding (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications Inc., 1997), 3.
4

Jeremy Packer and Craig Robertson, introduction to Thinking with James Carey, eds. Jeremy Packer and
Craig Robertson (New York: Peter Lang Publishing, 2006), 1-10.
5

See Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979),
357-389. I am using the term ‘hermeneutic intent’ as direct reference to Rorty’s notion that hermeneutics is
not method for attaining truth but for greater understanding – verstehen -- although Rorty does not use the
term. Put another way, according to Rorty hermeneutics is an attempt to make sense of what is happening
at a stage where we are still unsure of how even to describe it and then to proceed “nonreductively.”
Rorty’s conceptualization of hermeneutics draws heavily from the book Truth and Method by Hans-Georg
Gadamer that he (Rorty) reads as a tract against the very notion of method in philosophy. I will address the
issues of method in the social sciences and mass communications in the first chapter of this project.

3

exploring the subsequent debates and questions it leaves for his readers.6
The methodological approach to this project will first involve an analysis of
Carey’s scholarship with respect to the three most salient currents in his work: his
critique of positivism; his cultural studies alternative; and his cultural/historical inquires
into communications technology. Secondly, this study will investigate the intellectual
history of mass communications in order to situate Carey among his peers and
contextualize his thought. I am using the phrase “intellectual history” in the same way
that the journalism historian David Paul Nord uses it, meaning simply a history of
thought.7
The aim of any intellectual history is to delineate intellectual presuppositions,
identify general patterns of thought and central debates, and then analyze how these
issues evolve over time.8 For example, the first era of interest for this study will be the
period of intellectual domination of positivist social scientific research following the
Second World War and enduring into the Cold War. The second era begins with the antipositivist revolt that became widespread throughout the social sciences and mass
communications in the 1960s; this decade marks the beginning of the cultural turn in
communications research. By the mid-to late 1990s, American cultural studies reached a
period of uncertainty as some academics attacked it for being too celebratory of popular

6

Jonathan Sterne, “James Carey and Resistance to Cultural Studies in North America,” Cultural Studies 23,
no. 2 (2009): 283. Here, Sterne borrows the term ‘epistemic individual’ from the French thinker Pierre
Bourdieu; see Pierre Bourdieu, Homo Academicus, trans. Peter Collier (Stanford: Stanford University
Press, 1988).
7

David Paul Nord, “Intellectual History, Social History, Cultural History, and Our History,” Journalism
Quarterly 67, no. 4 (1990): 645.
8

John C. Greene, “Objectives and Methods in Intellectual History,” The Mississippi Valley Historical
Review 44, no. 1 (1957): 59-60.
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media culture and for becoming too politically disengaged and historically ill-informed.9
My methodological intent for this thesis is to track these intellectual patterns and Carey’s
relationship to them within their historical context.
This thesis is less a strict biography of James W. Carey and more an analysis of
his thought and its relation to the intellectual currents within his own discipline; in that
sense, it might be useful to call it an intellectual biography. By Carey’s “discipline” I
mean the academic profession of journalism and mass communications in which he was a
teacher and administrator, but Carey’s scholarly work was by its nature multidisciplinary
and hard to fit into any specific typology. Carey dealt with issues of culture,
communications theory, journalism, media, politics, technology, and methodology
throughout his career in many different contexts. Since any attempt to categorize Carey’s
subject matter would in some way be insufficient, I will use the general term
“communications” when referring to it. The best method for defining the nature of
Carey’s subject matter is to discuss it and trace some of its unifying themes, a major goal
for this project, rather than attempting to define it explicitly.
Thesis Outline
The first chapter will discuss and explore Carey’s critique of the “media effects
tradition,” the reigning social scientific paradigm in the study of mass communications.
Even a casual reader of Carey would notice that much of his work is concerned with the
intellectual trajectory of North American mass communications research. Indeed, the first
four chapters of his most well-known book, Communication as Culture, address the

9

Catherine A. Warren and Mary Douglas Vavrus eds., introduction to American Cultural Studies (Urbana:
University of Illinois Press, 2002), 1-11; Daniel Czitrom, “Does Cultural Studies Have a Past?” in
American Cultural Studies, 13-22.
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issues of the scientism in mass communication research and the alternative paths he
advocated. This first chapter will add to the conversation about “positivism” in the
discipline by reviewing Carey’s critique and by explaining the institutional background
of “scientism” and its lack of success in finding mechanistic explanations for human
communication.
Of course, Carey did not simply advocate that the media effects tradition be
abandoned with nothing left in its place. The second chapter will discuss Carey’s project
of “cultural studies” as his desired path for inquiry in communication. In other words, this
chapter will be concerned with Carey’s epistemological position. It will explore his
discussion of the transmission and ritual binary in communication research and
communication itself, as well as his commitment to and advocacy of democratic ideals
and philosophical pragmatism in scholarship. This chapter will also address the various
criticisms and debates that accompany the adoption of cultural studies in university
curricula and Carey’s reaction to these debates. For example, critics of Carey’s form of
American cultural studies have claimed that his cultural approach to studying media does
not adequately address power relations in society. This chapter will address these
criticisms and probe Carey’s views on power relations in culture. This discussion will
examine his relation to the political lines that became drawn as splits began to occur in
cultural studies between those who favored the political economic analysis of institutions
and those, like Carey, who favored a cultural analysis that was less politically motivated
and sought primarily to understand the cultural rituals and symbols of others.
The final chapter of this thesis will address Carey’s ideas concerning “technology
and ideology.” Carey’s concern with communications technology sprang from his interest
in the work of Canadian academics Marshall McLuhan and Harold Innis and their
6

analysis of different forms of technology. Carey’s attention to technology and its
relationship to political and popular culture is a major theme in his scholarship, and he
returned to it many times throughout his career. Carey’s approach to technology includes
a critique of it as an ideological category, the utopian belief that technology progresses
naturally towards improving the human condition, a position Carey and his co-author
John Quirk firmly rejected.
To support his position against this ideology of technology, Carey focused his
analysis on how the physical structure of a technology, like the telegraph, influenced its
use and cultural effects. For example, in his well-known essay on the telegraph, Carey
argued that the telegraph “reworked the nature of written language and finally the nature
of awareness itself”10 and made obsolete more long form, nuanced, and detailed news
reporting in favor of the transmission of bits of information. In this chapter, I will outline
the origins of Carey’s views on technology and their considerable relationship to the
thought of Canadian economist Harold Innis, whose work I argue is essential to a fuller
understanding of Carey’s own work on technology.
Background
James William Carey was born in Providence, Rhode Island, on September 7,
1934, the second of six children. During the war, his father worked in the shipyards and
his mother in the textile mills. Carey described his family’s ongoing employment status
as a constant flow of ups and downs between relative economic security and unexpected
job loss, but they were never abjectly poor. None of his immediate family had university
educations; in fact, Carey was the first in his family to go to college. But his family was
10

Carey, “Technology and Ideology: The Case of the Telegraph,” in Communications as Culture (New
York: Routledge, 2009), 162.
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very politically active: both his mother and aunt were union organizers when they were
not working in the mills, and it is no doubt that Carey’s intellectual development was
influenced by this early exposure to political life.11
Carey was diagnosed with a congenital heart disease when he was in the first
grade at a time when the only treatment for such an aliment was a recommendation for
rest and isolation from crowded places like schools. So, because of his illness, Carey was
kept out of school until he was 14 years old. Unable to join the military and unfit for
factory work, Carey was able to go to the University of Rhode Island on a disability
scholarship in 1952. Carey had an intuitive grasp of subjects like history and English but
was unable to enroll in a liberal arts program because he lacked the necessary high school
credits. So, Carey received his degree in business taking mostly economics and business
administration courses. After completing his degree, he went on to graduate school to
study journalism and advertising at the University of Illinois because he considered it to
be the “safe route” as he had written for a student newspaper and thought he might go
someplace where he could write journalistically.12
Carey finished his Ph.D. at Illinois after having written two dissertations, one on
economics and communications (he was not happy with this work), and one on Harold
Innis and Marshall McLuhan (he was pleased with this work and later published it).
Obviously, his diverse interests were evident early in his career. He eventually became a
professor at the University of Illinois in the department of journalism, where he taught
communications courses that were offered as electives. It was then, in the fall of 1963, as

11

Carey and Lawrence Grossberg, "From New England to Illinois" in Thinking with James Carey, 11-13.

12

Ibid., 17-19.
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a young professor, that Carey first suggested the title of Cultural Studies as a label for the
study of the media and society.13
Carey went on to lead a distinguished academic career, which included becoming
Dean of the College of Communications at the University of Illinois in 1979, and then in
1992 joining the faculty at Columbia University’s School of Journalism. At Columbia,
Carey was instrumental in founding a Ph.D. program in communications and philosophy
within the journalism school that was a separate entity from the professional degrees the
school offered. Carey had to fight to ensure others within the department that his program
would not impinge on the professional programs, but his goal was to add a deep
intellectual foundation to a school whose original purpose was to train journalists not
produce academics. Carey, in many ways, added a depth to his field whose legacy can
certainly be felt today.14
To examine the work of James Carey is to uncover the ideas of someone with a
unique perspective. Carey’s work was essentially a constant dialogue with his own
discipline, his role as an educator, and the surrounding culture. To read his work, then, is
to encounter many of the major epistemological debates and fissures that lay hidden
under the surface of the research done within the schools of journalism and mass
communications and beyond. By focusing on just one man, one uncovers the major
philosophical questions as to what it means to engage in social inquiry and the difficult
issues that must be negotiated as to the role of the “expert” within a democratic society.
Therefore, to read Carey is to become immersed in the history of his discipline and to

13

Ibid., 20.

14

James Boylan, Pulitzer’s School: Columbia University’s School of Journalism, 1903-2003 (New York:
Columbia University Press, 2003), 240.

9

engage in a conversation that should never stop as to the proper role of social inquiry in
human affairs. Such debates do not come with easy answers, but by examining Carey’s
thought in relation to his discipline, it is my hope to open up these debates and to keep
the conversation going.

10

CHAPTER 2
CAREY AND THE INTELLECTUAL HISTORY OF MASS COMMUNICATIONS
The following chapter is concerned with the epistemology of the “media effects
tradition” and Carey’s case for abandoning it. Carey once remarked that in order to
successfully interpret a scholarly text, one must “grasp the structure of the argument into
which it is an entry and the identity of the combatants to which it is addressed.”15 With
this comment in mind, I can think of no better way to approach the nature of Carey’s own
work in this area. Without some contextual background, especially as to the combatants
Carey was addressing, some of his more important epistemological claims might go
overlooked. Therefore, this chapter will locate Carey’s place in the history of the study of
mass communications by reviewing its dominant research traditions and also by
examining Carey’s contribution to our understanding of them. This exercise will be a
small but important contribution to the intellectual history of the discipline.
A “Lay Epistemologist”
Carey was quick to remind his readers that the intellectual trajectory of his
discipline was (and is) situated within a context or a history of thought.16 Carey’s

15

Carey, “The Roots of Modern Media Analysis: Lewis Mumford and Marshall McLuhan,” in James
Carey: A Critical Reader, 31.
16

I think it is important to note that the term “history” is loaded such that the philosopher M. Foucault
avoided it and thus borrowed the Nietzschean terms “genealogy” and “archeology” to describe his
historical investigations. The problem that Foucault and others have sought to avoid is that the term
“history” in western society implies a linear narrative of continuous progression and rationality (with a
beginning, middle, and end). It is important in discussions of the intellectual history of mass
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thinking on such matters was influenced by Thomas Kuhn (1922-1996), whose book The
Structure of Scientific Revolutions brought the challenge of historical interpretation to the
belief that science is an accumulation of knowledge that gradually moves towards an
exact understanding of physical reality. Kuhn, a physicist and scientific historian, argued
famously that the practice of “normal science” operates within dominant paradigms that
determine basic assumptions, directions for inquiry, methodology, and issues of
verisimilitude.17 For Kuhn, a revolution in science occurs when a dominant paradigm is
overturned; put somewhat differently, a revolution in science occurs when a new solution
to a problem is discovered that violates the standards of the old research tradition but
whose logic comes to be accepted by the relevant community.18 Kuhn’s project showed
the historical context in which such revolutions took place and how older ideas give way
to new ones by being completely reconstituted.
Considering that he was heavily concerned with larger epistemological issues in
the study of mass communications, it is of little surprise that Carey admired the work of
Kuhn. An extraordinary scientific historian and epistemologist, Kuhn almost singlehandedly dismantled the image of natural science as a self-contained enterprise that
operated efficiently on its own internal logic. The effects of Kuhn’s ideas were felt well
beyond the disciplinary boundaries of scientific history and made “paradigm” one of the
most used words in academic English. For instance, it is revealing that Carey referred to
the dominant “paradigm” in the study of mass communications as the “media effects

communications to remember that this story is somewhat discontinuous and that the passage of time does
not necessarily ensure progress.
17

Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1996).

18

See discussion in Ronald N. Giere, Explaining Science: A Cognitive Approach (Chicago: The University
of Chicago Press, 1990), 32-38.
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tradition.” Carey consciously avoided the term paradigm because, as a lay epistemologist
himself, he was well aware of the implications of using the term because of its
relationship to the natural sciences. Kuhn had used “paradigm” in the context of natural
science--the majority of his examples were from physics--but Carey had no interest in
constructing the study of mass communication as a science searching for natural laws and
falsifiable claims.
Carey’s project was a revolt against positivism in the social sciences more
generally and the study of mass communications in particular. Carey wanted essentially
to shape the study of the media into a new branch of the humanities.19 An eloquent critic,
Carey stood for a complete rejection of the idea that only through the application of
methodologies from the natural sciences could social inquiries be both reliable and valid
(this is sometimes called naturalism). Carey was annoyed by the reductionism in the
positivist research of the effects tradition, and he viewed it as a stagnant intellectual
outlook that avoided the complexity of social life in the pursuit of a “value free” science
of mass communications.
Carey was well informed about the intellectual history of the research traditions
that fall under the umbrella of journalism and mass communications. Carey’s interest in
this history was not coincidental, of course; Carey used his discussions about the
intellectual history of his discipline as a weapon to advocate for a major shift in its
dominant research traditions. By discussing this history, Carey pointed to the politically
and culturally contingent factors that had influenced his discipline’s development in order
to strengthen his call for an alternative path.

19

Carey, “Humanities are Central to Doctoral Studies.” Insights: The Journal of the Association of Schools
of Journalism and Mass Communication (1989): 2-5.

13

Carey’s audience was a generation of quantitative, social scientific, mass
communications scholars committed to the “empirical” study of media effects. Stephan
Jay Gould’s comment that most natural scientists “don’t care a fig about history” is
generally true for social scientists as well.20 Quantitative social scientists in mass
communications are trained to gather and analyze data; they are adept in operationalizing
concepts, finding statistical correlations, and interpreting data sets. All of these
techniques are standard operating procedure in the methodological canon of mass
communications research, which primarily includes quantitative content media analysis,
mass social scientific surveying, and psychological experimentation. But social scientists
do not study, or even give much thought to, the history of the intellectual processes in
which they are engaged. Beginning in the early 1960s and 1970s, Carey began to remind
professional social scientists in communication that the methodological traditions and

epistemological claims to which they were committed had a history and one not without
controversy and relevant philosophical debates.
Carey, Intellectual History, and Mass Communications
Carey described the path of communications research in the United States as
guided by two models, which he expressed in another one of his characteristic binaries. In
his words, “one model of communication was seen as a mode of domination, in another
as a form of therapy; in one model people were motivated to pursue power and in the
other to flee anxiety.”21 Carey’s two models did, in fact, encompass a great deal of the
type of the research done in the so-called media effects tradition. Yet, the most important
20

Stephan Jay Gould, The Mismeasure of Man (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1996), 25.

21

Carey, “Space, Time, and Communications,” in Communication as Culture, 112-113.
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contribution of Carey was not the generalizability of this binary. What is most important
was Carey’s effort to remind his readers of an obvious fact, that these two models “were
also models for the enactment of the communication process, powerful models of an
actual social practice [emphasis mine].”22 That is, as an actual social practice, the
research done within these two models responded to, and was shaped by, the social
context in which they emerged.
Of course, Carey’s scholarship in these areas of intellectual history had more of
an influence on his students and sympathetic acquaintances than his quantitative social
scientist colleagues. One such acquaintance, the historian Daniel Czitrom, went on to
write one of the more balanced accounts of the history of the “media effects” tradition
that was far more wide-ranging than versions common in the field in the 1980s when he
wrote. Heavily influenced by Carey, much of Czitrom’s historiography of the study of
mass communications in the U.S. was an extension of Carey’s own thought in book
length form; it included figures like John Dewey, Robert Park, Charles Cooley, Harold
Innis, and Marshall McLuhan, all figures who were not normally included in effects
tradition history unlike figures like Walter Lippmann or Paul Lazarsfeld.23 Czitrom, a
professional historian by trade, added analytical depth to the alternative history that
Carey originated.
The intellectual history of the media-effects tradition is a story about the eventual
confluence of a variety of different enterprises that, for various reasons, took an interest
in understanding the social impact of modern mass communications. Czitrom provided a
22

Ibid., 113.

23

For his reflection on the influence of Carey on his book, see Daniel J. Czitrom, “Twenty-five years later,”
Critical Studies in Mass Communication 24, no. 5 (2007): 481-485.
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useful taxonomy of these types of research, what he called “empirical media study,” and
it included the following categories: (1) propaganda analysis; (2) public opinion analysis;
(3) social psychological analysis; and (4) marketing.24 The basic premise of all of these
forms of effects research presupposed that mass media had at least some form of effect
on an audience’s attitudes and behavior, and all of this research wanted to know more in
order to utilize and/or control the power of the new mass media environment.
All of these forms of research relied on a positive science of social relations,
which is essentially what Czitrom was referring to when he wrote of “empirical media
study.” He suggested that that these founding researchers’ understanding of human action
owed tacitly to the behaviorism of J.B. Watson and relied heavily on quantitative social
scientific methods believed to uphold professional standards for objectivity. These forms
of inquiry assumed a stolid quality and presentation, or as Carey put it, “[t]hey assume
that the flattened scientific forms of speech and prose, that peculiar quality of presumed
disinterest and objectivity, are the only mode in which truth can be formulated.”25 This
style of inquiry owed to the standards for objectivity that had found new life in the 1920s
in American sociology, and elsewhere, as the old idea that social inquiry should imitate
the natural sciences became more prominent during the interwar period and remained
dominant through much of the Cold War.26
24

Daniel J. Czitrom, “The Rise of Empirical Media Study,” in Media and the American Mind: From Morse
to McLuhan (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1982), 122-146.
25

Carey, “Mass Communication and Cultural Studies,” in Communication as Culture, 38.

26

The idea that social inquiry should imitate the natural sciences can be traced to French philosopher
Auguste Comte (1798-1857). For an examination of Comte’s ideas on American intellectual life see Gillis
Harp, Positivist Republic: Auguste Comte and the Reconstruction of American Liberalism, 1865-1920
(University Park: The Pennsylvania State University, 1995); On the scientism of American sociology see
Robert C. Bannister, Sociology and Scientism: 1880-1940 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina
Press, 1987).
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Of course, one immediately notices that Czitrom’s taxonomy was quite
fragmented, filled with a range of institutional prerogatives and varying political and
cultural struggles. Carey’s audacious opening sentence to his 1996 essay, “The Chicago
School and the History of Mass Communications Research,” spoke to this inherent
fragmentation when he wrote that “[s]trictly speaking there is no history of mass
communications research.”27 He went on to explain that a whole host of writers,
impossible to classify or lump together, from as far back as the seventeenth century had
been writing about issues that could fall under the heading mass communications; it was
thus almost impossible to assemble a clear linear narrative about this kind of intellectual
history.
Carey pointed out that what is called the “history of mass communications
research” is merely a recently assembled and relatively minor literary genre. In Carey’s
version of the story, the intellectual history of the effects tradition had been assembled for
a variety of purposes in order to justify and legitimate a new twentieth-century invention
of the mass media and its related institutions, and to give direction and status to a

27

Carey, “The Chicago School and the History of Mass Communications research,” James Carey: A
Critical Reader, 14. In this essay, Carey argued, essentially, that the work of what is generally referred to
as the “Chicago School of Sociology,” namely the work of Robert Park, Charles Cooley, and John Dewey,
contained observations about communications that were a necessary component of a more complete
intellectual history of the discipline of mass communications. But Carey’s discussion of the “Chicago
School of Sociology” was a highly bracketed one that only included the work of the three aforementioned
authors. Obviously, some scholars have criticized Carey’s characterization of the “Chicago School”
because it reduced an entire department to the thought of a few scholars–although, Carey was hardly the
first to utilize the “Chicago School” trope. Obviously, a fuller view of the “Chicago School” would take
into account the departmental divides that existed because this famous department was made up of
academics with very different, sometimes competing views very much at odds with one another. See
discussion in Jefferson Pooley, “Daniel Czitrom, James W. Carey, and the Chicago School,” Critical
Studies in Mass Communication 24, no. 5 (2007): 469-472; See also Harold S. Becker, “The Chicago
School, So-Called,” Qualitative Sociology 22, no. 1 (1999): 3-12.
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professional class of teachers and research serving those institutions.28 In other words, the
field’s origin story had been constructed to legitimize the needs of a new professionalized
class of teachers, researchers, and media workers. The actual history, though, is much
more fragmented and messy.
Therefore, given the fragmented nature of research in mass communications, the
dangers of constructing an alternative intellectual history are fraught with potential cliffs
and hurdles.29 This is because an “intellectual history” is a historiography of ideas that
attempts to examine multiple, fluid strains of thought and research. The subject matter is
further complicated by the fact that some research traditions are in active competition
with others, some are dominant and others not—and some remain dormant waiting to be
discovered again. Nevertheless, the perceived intellectual history, or rather the dominant
one, bounds academic practice to an identity about the research being carried out and its
methods and goals. Carey understood this and sought to change the perception of this
history with a critical analysis and an alternative version that included thinkers like John
Dewey, Harold Innis, and even Clifford Geertz.
A Brief History Media Effects Research: “Strong Effects”
The standard version of the media effects research tradition’s history – by which I
mean the version that is told by practitioners in mass communications – begins in the
years surrounding WWI. Of course, as mentioned before, much commentary had been
written before this time period that could certainly be considered research into mass
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communications, but one must begin somewhere, and this is generally considered to be
the genesis of the more modern forms of “media effects” research.30 Research into what
came to be called the “hypodermic needle” view of communications, which is the view
that mass media messages have a direct influence on one’s thoughts and behavior (the
“strong effects” view), began during this time and was shaped in the context of mass
industrial warfare. Carey’s comment that the history of communications research was
“hardly an innocent history” was an allusion to this war-related aspect of this intellectual
history.31 More generally, this early history of “media effects” research in the United
States was tied almost exclusively to the interests of commercialism and the state, with
the possible exception of social psychological analysis, which in its infancy was
concerned with the effects of mass media on children and adolescents.
Commercial interests in mass communications research were very
straightforward. In the years following WWI, consumer surveys were widespread among
marketers as improvements in statistical sampling and survey techniques added the
verisimilitude of these types of social data. The importance of market research increased
in tandem with the growth of commercial radio because, unlike print media, a radio
program’s audience could not be calculated with a simple observation of circulation.32 As
the historian Sarah Igo has made clear, however, it was not obvious in the 1920s that the
public would be open to the prying questions of market researchers. Indeed, businesses
had to be convinced as to the utility of these new methods of consumer research even if
30
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they stood to gain from this type of data. Consumer surveys and their associated data on
consumer behavior were made “valid” and acceptable by a fluid socio-cultural process
that shaped the perception of the public as much as it reflected it.33
Research into the effects of propaganda became a significant endeavor on the part
of all the governments involved in both world wars. In the United States, much attention
was paid to what historian Christopher Simpson has aptly called the “science of
coercion,” or rather wartime propaganda efforts that included all of the seemingly
innocuous and more nefarious efforts one might expect of a government trying to
persuade a passive domestic population to support war and then to convince an enemy of
its defeat.34
Naturally, such a new and concentrated effort to alter public opinion on behalf of
the state came with a subsequent backlash and a general apprehension towards the newer
mass media and its power. Postwar views among the public towards propaganda became
loaded with a view of sinister forces hard at work to control the opinions of an unwitting
public. Such anxieties about the mass media’s power and the potential of that perceived
power in service of national interests became the focus of much of the earlier research on
state propaganda and its effects as the research reflected on these popular anxieties.35
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Carey’s power and anxiety models of communications research are encapsulated
in the word propaganda itself. In his well-known book Propaganda, Edward Bernays,
nephew of Sigmund Freud and the so-called “father of public relations,” examined the
etymology of the word propaganda and pointed out that the word did not gain its negative
connotation for subversive mendacity until the 1920s.36 It was not until after the first and
second world wars that the word in popular parlance was used with the ubiquitous
negative connotation it has today. The final straw was, of course, the Nazi regime. That
infamous regime’s use of propaganda forever made the word itself forever associated
with lies, half-truths, and mass manipulation. To take one example: consider the writings
of radical writers like Emma Goldman in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
The word propaganda was used quite frequently and with a positive connation, in this
case with an aim to propagate a socialist and revolutionary ideology.37
The political scientist Harold Lasswell was one of the forerunners of early
propaganda research and is considered one of the founders of mass communications
research as well. His work on the style and techniques of propaganda focused on the
individual psychology of central political figures—Hitler, for example—and how their
personalities reflected on their attempts to manipulate mass public opinion through the
alteration and manipulation of symbols. Lasswell also studied propaganda from a more
macro perspective, looking into questions of how the media operated, its role in politics,
and how it could be utilized to manage public opinion in an American context.38 And it
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was Lasswell who famously coined the major question to which a science of
communication should be directed: “who says what in which channel to whom with what
effect.”39 Lasswell’s conception of this new science was that social scientists would
reveal how to use mass media to influence target audiences, and they would do this
through an ostensibly apolitical process of scientific progression and application of the
resulting knowledge.
Lasswell is also credited with developing the first forms of quantitative content
analysis, one part of the methodological trinity of “empirical media effects research” that
includes social scientific surveys and psychological experiments. Carey’s models of
power and anxiety communications research were embodied in Lasswell’s work, most
noticeably in his views on the proper uses of propaganda and the role of social scientists
in shaping public opinion through the mass media, what Edward Bernays called the
“engineering of consent.” But for Carey, the major thinker that laid the foundation for
research about the media was, of course, the “father of American journalism,” Walter
Lippmann whose book Public Opinion (1922) made the role of the expert essential for
the shaping of the public mind and the smooth functioning of an “administrative
democracy.”
Public Opinion Research
The history of mass communication research in the effects tradition is closely
aligned with the quantitative techniques of mass polling. Many of the sampling methods
and survey techniques for public opinion research common today were fully developed
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by the mid-1930s. But the academic concern with public opinion and polling had taken
shape during the Progressive Era (roughly 1890-1920), mainly in response to the
explosive issues concerning labor and capital. Labor statistics bureaus began to flourish
as reformers needed to be able to point to more balanced reports and less controversial
data collection.40 The quantification of social facts was a socially progressive
phenomenon, and it encouraged the growth of a professionalized class trained in the
statistical methods necessary to gather the data and interpret the results.
Indeed, the quantitative measurements of public opinion by national surveys and
mass polling have transformed the way the public is conceived, marketed to, and
governed in the modern United States.41 Methods of mass surveying are techniques that
enforce a high level of discipline on both the administrators of the survey and of the
respondents; in this process, opinions themselves were formally standardized. Social
scientists in the interwar period learned quickly that logically equivalent forms of the
same question produced very different answers, and so the level of standardization had to
be increased to decrease this variation.42 But the forms of standardization and the mode
of quantification used have never been completely divorced from power relations in the
workforce and elsewhere. The difference between public opinion polls and surveys of
academics provides a vivid example of this dynamic. Where opinion polling relied on
standardized questions and answers, surveys of academic “attitude”––or rather their
opinions on social issues––allowed for survey administrators to rephrase questions, vary
40
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the order, and allowed for the respondent to use their own words. Public opinion polling,
on the other hand, was only made valid after the fact, after the questions and answers
adhered to an acceptable level of discipline that could be quantified and analyzed.43
The academic concern with public opinion in early twentieth century America
was in part a further outgrowth of Carey’s “power and anxiety” model, but also in part
what media scholar Michael Schudson has called a “democratic realism” that emerged in
the 1920s.44 This “democratic realism” found its most articulate spokesman in a former
government propagandist and journalist, Walter Lippmann. Lippmann pointed to the
problems inherent in democracy given the fact that it was impossible for an average
citizen to be totally informed about all the issues confronting the nation at any given time.
He argued famously that it was necessary for the establishment of an independent
“intelligence bureau” to provide expert and objective opinions based on factual
information to political leaders and the public.45
Lippmann’s democratic realism was the first complete articulation of a new brand
of administrative democracy, that is, a type of civics that placed the role of “experts” over
that of the “public” and is essentially the brand of democracy that is characteristic of
American politics today. John Dewey famously argued against the necessity of a new
class of experts to shape public opinion in a review of Lippmann’s book Public Opinion,
first published by the magazine The New Republic in 1927.46 Carey’s reappraisal of this
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Dewey/Lippmann debate––with Carey, of course, siding with Dewey––influenced many
journalism historians’ and media scholars’ understanding of the role of the expert in a
democratic society.47 Carey, like Dewey, believed that the establishment of Lippmann’s
intelligence bureau would merely lead to a group of academics primarily concerned with
their own status and prestige rather than serving the greater public interest.
In an essay first published in 1982, Carey characterized Lippmann’s notion of
“democratic realism” in the following way: “Lippmann endorsed the notion that it was
possible to have a science of society such that scientists might constitute a new
priesthood: the possessors of truth as a result of having an agreed upon method for its
determination.”48 In an essay published in 1995, Carey built on his original critique of
Lippmann and argued that Lippmann’s notion of “democratic realism” relegated
journalism to the practice of translating the “arcane language of experts” into something
digestible by a mass public.49 This translation process transmitted the judgments of
experts and in this process ratified those judgments legitimate. In this sense, the public
played no role in the democratic process and was instead only an audience to the
decisions made on their behalf. In Carey’s words, “[p]ublic opinion no longer refers to
opinions being expressed in public and then recorded by the press. Public opinion is
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formed by the press and then modeled by the public opinion industry and the apparatus of
polling.50
In Carey’s version, it was Lippmann who marked the genesis of the culturally
resonant notion that experts should play the primary role in American conversations
about civics. According to Carey, Lippmann’s Public Opinion “founded or at least
clarified a continuous tradition of research” on the mass media.51 Yet, despite the power
of his rhetorical ability, Lippmann simply gave an articulate voice to a cultural trend that
was already under way. It is true that by the late 1930s social scientists began to view
research in the effects of mass media as a realm of inquiry in which a new disciplinary
field could be organized. But in terms of the establishment of a new “priestly class,”
these types of professional modes of social inquiry, attempts to establish a science of
society, had begun to gain favor in the U.S. as early as the late nineteenth century, well
before Lippmann’s book was published in 1922.52 Yet Carey’s focus on Lippmann served
to address the standard version about the intellectual foundations of “effects tradition”
research––this focus on Lippmann was a politically motivated attack on the underlying
ideological premise of the positivist media research in his own discipline.
Lippmann’s “intelligence bureau” was, of course, never formed in the precise way
that he proposed; nevertheless, the spirit of his proposal gained traction. Survey
techniques and social scientific methods for national polling made “mass society,” or
rather national public opinion, comprehensible to an emerging class of professional social
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scientists; and these social scientists, in mass communications and elsewhere, followed
Lippmann’s articulation of the role of the social expert by clinging to a self-image of
detachment and objectivity; in doing so, they added to their prestige and respectability,
especially in the context of the political circumstances that arose during the Cold War.
The founding of the academic journal Public Opinion Quarterly in 1937 embodied the
essence of Lippmann’s call for a new role of the public opinion expert. The forward in
the inaugural issue illustrates this point:
A new situation has arisen throughout the world, created by the spread of literacy among
the people and the miraculous improvement of the means of communication. Always the
opinions of relatively small publics have been a prime force in political life, but now, for
the first time in history, we are confronted nearly everywhere by mass opinion as the final
determinant of political and economic action…. Scholarship is developing new
possibilities of scientific approach as a means of verifying hypotheses and of introducing
greater precision of thought and treatment.53
This statement showcases the anxiety, hopes, and desires of the new “priestly class” in
discovering a positive science of communication that is clearly in line with Lippmann’s
original thesis.
Social Psychology: From Strong to Limited Effects
If much of the early media effects tradition discussed thus far dealt in the realm of
commercialism and politics, and by extension an overarching concern with media and
political power, the last form of the effects tradition to become dominant dealt in the
realm of social psychology. In terms of this social psychological approach, the Payne
Fund studies on motion pictures and children are an early example of the dawn of this
type of analysis. The Payne Fund studies were twelve studies coordinated by W.W.
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Charters in the early 1930s that sought to examine the effects of viewing movies on
children and adolescents.54 The study authors generally acknowledged the complexity of
the situation—specifically that it was difficult to draw a direct line of causality between
juvenile delinquency and the viewing of motion pictures. (This nuance was quickly
thrown aside in popular press.) That some of the studies contained correlational data
about viewing movies and general anti-social behavior was all that was needed to inflame
popular anxieties about newer media and its effects. These studies received much
attention and were often selectively quoted in what was basically a populist attack on the
motion picture industry for its perceived corruption of youth.55
Note here that the Payne Fund studies were archetypal of Carey’s anxiety model
communications research. Thus, the historical importance of the Payne Fund studies
stems from their relationship to the society more so than their analysis of it. These
studies reflected in themselves the popular angst towards newer media contained in the
larger society in which they took place; they are prime examples of “therapy” for these
popular fears about new media. In this way, the Payne Fund studies were an early
academic response to anxieties about the impact of mass media, much like the research
done on the effects of violent television shows on children done more today. 56 Carey’s
Kuhnian observation about the importance of social context in the production of social
research helps explain these studies, and should inform our conception of such studies
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today.
As Carey observed, the anxiety over media effects on children is one of the only
remaining forms of the “strong-effects” theory in modern media effects research; this is
because children are believed to be more vulnerable to the media to which they are
exposed. On the other hand, the “hypodermic needle” or “strong-effects” theory of an allpowerful media has generally faded out of fashion, only to be revived occasionally for
various forms of ideological hand wringing. Fully-grown adults are seen to be capable of
discerning between media that are harmful or mendacious and media that are not.
According to the “limited effects” model, more or less established by researchers like
Paul Lazarsfeld and Joseph Klapper beginning in the 1930s and 1940s, adults are
protected from the harmful effects of mass media by numerous mediating factors. Some
of these protective mediating factors are personal psychology, meaning that people seek
out media to fulfill personal interest and desires, and some are social, meaning that
people assign meanings to mass media according to the social groups to which they
belonged.57
In the standard view of the intellectual history of mass communications, the shift
from the “strong effects” theory to a more “limited effects” theory essentially ruled out
the fears of propaganda for producing dangerous extremism en masse. One of the most
well-known studies completed during this period that challenged the popular notion of an
all-powerful mass media, and led to the “limited-effects” theories more or less dominant
today, was published in 1944 by “arch-quantifier” Paul L. Lazarsfeld and his colleagues,
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Bernard Berelson and Hazel Gaudet, called The People’s Choice.58 This study relied on
interviews with approximately six hundred respondents to determine the level of
influence campaign messages had on voters during a presidential election. What the study
found has already been discussed, namely that personal relationships were very important
in the political decisions of individuals. That this rather prosaic finding was found to be
interesting is revealing of the intellectual climate in which it was done and the popular
notions about media that existed; this study reaffirmed the good sense of the American
public and implicitly congratulated the functioning of American liberal democracy. It
also pushed academic discussions about what the media ought to be, towards positivist
discussions about what it is.
In the postwar years, the limited effects model firmly took hold and as Carey put
it “the research tradition [became] largely a mopping up operation: the closer and more
detailed specification of the specific operation of mediating and intervening factors.”59
While Carey’s articulation of the path this research tradition took was basically
caricature, there was much truth in it. What happened to the media effects tradition after
the end of WWII and into the 1950s and beyond became a relatively uninteresting debate
about media effects, with no firm answers, and no grand theories or explanations.
Bernard Berelson, the distinguished mass communications scholar who was a co-author
of the study with Lazarsfeld and Gaudet that introduced the limited effects theoretical
perspective, famously reached a breaking point in 1959 and publically announced that the
field was going nowhere: “We are on a plateau of research development, and have been
58
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for some time.”60
Despite Berelson’s announcement, however, the research has continued. Within
the discipline, debates as to questions about the media’s effects became locked between
oscillating views of a minimal-effects-theory of media,61 and a not-so-minimal effects
theory.62 That is to say, scholars have varied significantly in their positions about the
level of impact of the media’s messages over the past fifty years of communications
research regardless of the increasingly complex and abstruse methods and statistical
models used. The trend of minimal-effects-theory sees media messages as having
negotiated meanings within minds of their audience. The not-so-minimal effects school
of theory, on the other hand, view the media as having a more powerful influence than
the minimal-school might assert, and the debate continues to this day.63
Given the effects research tradition’s inertia, Carey, in characteristic fashion,
diagnosed the situation in this way: “[u]nder these circumstances, we can continue to wait
for our Newton to arise within the traditional framework, but that increasingly feels like
waiting for Godot.”64 A Newton of communications has never arrived, but the reasons for
the institutionalization of the effects tradition and how it was cemented and expanded had
nothing to do with its intellectual success or failure. The research institutions and
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methodological commitments of American sociologists and mass communications
scholars have stemmed from an American intellectual culture dedicated to “scientism”
and “positivism.” These commitments are in one sense the product of intellectual culture,
but in another sense they were the product of purely political circumstances that came out
the Cold War.
The Cold War and Positivist Social Science
The type of positivist research that Carey railed against in the 1960s and 1970s
had been greatly expanded by state prerogatives and underlying political realities; the
positivist social scientific paradigm in mass communications and other disciplines owes
much if its prestige to the legacy of the Cold War. According to social science historian
Theodore Porter, the postwar period from 1945 to the late 1960s saw the social sciences
becoming closely intertwined with the pragmatic and ideological requirements of the
Cold War. Porter maintains that the effects of McCarthyism did not so much politicize
the academy as depoliticize it. The Cold War provided incentive for social scientists of
all shades to focus on the technical tools of science, the practical application of statistics,
and the embrace of neutrality and detachment as distinct from the more value based,
morally engaged, and subjective analysis of earlier forms of social inquiry. Of course, this
form of academic depoliticization was itself political; avoidance of political issues
completely is one form of status-quo conservatism. Because of their insistence on
independence and their preoccupation with neutral objectivity, a large number of Cold
War social scientists disavowed the values and interests that shaped the production of
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social knowledge in the first place.65
The Cold War period saw the social sciences in the United States reach
unprecedented levels of prestige and expansion; the relevance of “scientific” or
systematic planning for the purposes of national security had been growing in importance
since WWII. Porter and Carey both held that one cannot view the intellectual currents in
the social sciences during this period as independent from the interests and influence of
the state and the society. As a temporal backdrop for the overarching influences in the
social sciences generally, the Cold War provides a useful lens for inquiry into the
intellectual development of professional social research and the study of mass
communications, particularly for a generation of scholars of which Carey was a part.66
But there is more to the story.
The politically expedient forms of ideological obfuscation among academics
during the Cold War do not explain entirely the rise and influence of neutral, “value-free”
quantitative social science, which includes the field of mass communications. The
explosions over Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 signaled the power of the scientific
method in altering the material world; and from this power the idealization of the
scientific method as a model for all intellectual endeavors to follow in the post-war
period in the United States became institutionalized and cemented. This idealization,
added to the establishment of social scientists as an eminent professionalized class,
encouraged their desire to win for themselves prestige and influence among public and
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government administrators. This desire led them to even further embrace and advocate
objectivity.67 Therefore, the “effects tradition” drew its values of scientific objectivity
from historically and culturally contingent conditions in the United States. Carey’s
advocacy that we “talk less about rigor [in research] and more about originality” was both
a brave and intellectually necessary prescription for new approaches to the study of
media and communications.68 By the time Carey became a professor of communications
in the journalism department at the University of Illinois in 1963, the positivism within
his discipline was well entrenched, and it was not long before Carey began to outline an
alternative.
As philosopher and biologist Richard Lewontin noted, “[s]tudies of human
society become ‘social sciences’ with an apparatus of investigation and statistical
analysis that pretends that the process of investigation is not itself a social process.”69
Carey understood this point well, as he formulated the same idea in his essay
“Overcoming Resistance to Cultural Studies.” In this essay, he suggested that the search
for “a positive science of communication, one that elucidates the laws of human behavior
and the universal and univocal functions of the mass media,” should be abandoned for a
more interpretive approach that includes both historical and cultural investigations.70
The fact that a “science of society” has never been established, that the Newton of
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communications has never appeared, would not have surprised John Dewey, who was
telling us in 1927 many of the same things that Carey told us in the 1970s. As Dewey put
it,
The prestige of the mathematical and physical sciences is great, and properly so.
But the difference between facts which are what they are independent of human
desire and endeavor and facts which are to some extent what they are because of
human interest and purpose, and which alter with alteration in the latter, cannot be
rid of by any methodology. The more sincerely we appeal to facts, the greater is
the importance of the distinction between facts which condition human activity
and facts which are conditioned by human activity. In the degree which we ignore
this difference, social science becomes pseudo-science.71
Here, Dewey gives us the justification for the type of historical, interpretive, cultural
investigations that Carey advocated. A simpler way to express Dewey’s idea is that there
is an intrinsic difference between a blink and a wink. This example was made wellknown by Clifford Geertz, who borrowed it from the British philosopher Gilbert Ryle
(the philosopher who also provided Geertz with his famous method of “thick
description”).72 A blink is the result of a physiological process that can be explained in
terms of causal processes independent of “human desire and endeavor.” But a wink is no
such process. A wink cannot be understood in terms of causal relations but rather must be
classified as a practice; in Carey’s terms, a wink’s meaning must be culturally diagnosed
and understood. In other words, a blink can be explained, a wink must be interpreted.73
Nevertheless, a full discussion of Carey’s opposition to the implicit behaviorism
and explicit positivism in his discipline must include one very important caveat to his
71

Dewey, The Public and its Problems, 7.

72

Clifford Geertz, “Thick Description: Towards an Interpretative Theory of Culture,” in The Interpretation
of Cultures (New York: Basic Books, 1973), 6.
73

See Neil Postman “Social Science as Moral Theology,” in Conscientious Objections (New York: Vintage
Books 1992).

35

admonishment of these research traditions. In terms of the “media effects” research and
its associated positivism outlined thus far (by which I mean a commitment to
methodological rigor adopted from the natural sciences, statistical reasoning, and a
reliance on quantifiable data), it is not simply the case that the production of this social
data is merely an ideological predilection towards scientism that has no practical
application. Even Carey, in his more ecumenical moments, acknowledged that
methodological rigor in the production of quantified social data had its place. To this
point he wrote, “[t]o abandon the effects tradition does not entail doing away with
research methods, including the higher and more arcane forms of counting, that take up
so much time in our seminars…[n]o one, except the congenitally out of touch, suggests
we have to stop counting…”74 This point is obvious but necessary to make.
For example, the unemployment rate, to give one example, is the result of a
survey and its importance as a metric for social well-being is difficult to overstate. Of
course, such labor statistics are rooted in a progressive history that had a telos for the
improvement of society, not for establishing a disinterested science of it. Yet the ability
for a population to point to basic quantitative facts about itself is essential to the political
functioning of a modern society. No one, except “the congenitally out of touch,” would
argue that proper methods for obtaining facts, as accurate as possible, are important
because the alleviation of social ills requires information to guide progressive action
towards effective solutions. The problem arises when quantifiable answers begin to be
given to purely qualitative questions, or worse, when larger social questions concerning
culture, history, and the like are simply ignored in order to focus on small scale problems
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that are more congenial to standardized methods.
Indeed, the effect of these methodological commitments has led to a rather
impoverished view of the term “empirical” in the social sciences, which has limited it to
meaning only the abstracted statistical data about individuals as conceived by researchers.
Empiricism means to learn from experience, to reach conclusions only after viewing
relevant evidence, and in this way a historian looking at the diary of a president is no less
“empirical” than a sociologist examining the outcomes of a survey.75 What must be
emphasized is that such empirical observations of either the historian or the sociologist
are tied, whether implicitly or explicitly, to human “desires and endeavors” regardless of
their empirical merit. But the questions remains: “If not a science of society, then what?”
In the following chapter I will investigate the “cultural turn” in communications research
that Carey advocated and what he meant with the vague term “cultural studies” as his
alternative to the positivist effects tradition in mass communications.
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CHAPTER 3
A CULTURAL APPROACH: TRANSMISSION AND RITUAL
As the story goes, Carey began to advocate for a cultural turn in mass
communications scholarship in the early 1960s. By the 1960s, the positivist and
behaviorist paradigms in the social sciences writ large were coming under attack from a
variety of directions. Even in the natural sciences, the post-positivist movement, as
exemplified by Thomas Kuhn, Larry Laudan, Paul Feyerbend, and others, was successful
in dismantling the positivist notion of the internal logic of “pure science” (the honorific
name for physics) that saw science as a naturally progressing process of constantly
improving methods and knowledge of exact reality. The political and cultural turmoil of
the decade spelled even more trouble for the social sciences, including mass
communications, as the standard cookbook of sociological methods taken from the
natural sciences came under scrutiny for its apparent reductionism and inadequacies in
confronting what were inherently political issues.
Of course, what are now fashionably called qualitative methods have long had
their place in the history of what may more broadly be described as social inquiry. But
the dominance of quantitative methodologies in mass communications, and elsewhere,
has emerged because science and quantification have played a unique role in American
culture to a degree not encountered elsewhere.76 Yet, faced with the emerging challenge
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by qualitative and more interpretative methods that dealt explicitly with more overtly
political issues, the knowledge monopolies of positivist and behaviorist modes of inquiry
slowly gave way to alternative forms.77 This qualitative challenge was the result of a
long-standing academic dispute, of course, between literary-minded social critics and
quantitative social scientists, but it finally exploded as the result of changing political
realties outside of the academy. In journalism and mass communications, this dispute was
present in the early stages of the discipline and was epitomized by the very short-lived
collaboration between the quantitative researcher Paul Lazarsfeld and critical theorist
Theodore Adorno.78 But qualitative research became more viable as American political
turmoil made larger political and cultural questions more cultural resonant and seemingly
necessary. During the era of the Civil Rights Movement and the Vietnam War,
institutional self-introspection became more feasible as the fantasies of domestic Cold
War tranquility of the 1950s faded and American society came face-to-face with its own
hypocrisies and downfalls.
As American political culture transformed and the social sciences began to shift
their epistemological positions under the weight of internal criticism, these shifts were
accompanied by an increase in the reach of popular culture. The success of Keynesian
economics and the postwar boom gave way to a newfound prosperity for a generation of
baby boomers. The forms of consumer culture that had taken shape during the “roaring
twenties” thus became more accessible to younger Americans with more disposable
income. The significance of popular culture increased in tandem with consumerism as
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younger generations began to define themselves increasingly by their tastes in music,
movies, and television.79 Naturally, this increased importance of popular culture in
national life attracted interest on behalf of academics witnessing these transformations,
especially for scholars of media.80
As Lawrence Grossberg has observed, in North America cultural studies began to
show up in communications and education classrooms even before it appeared in those of
anthropology, literature, or American studies.81 The confluence of changes in the
American political and cultural environments that led to the aforementioned academic
“cultural turn” opened the doors for academic studies into American popular culture with
the critical methods used to analyze the western literary canon. Cultural studies in the
American context saw the field grow tremendously from the 1960s onward, and in the
field of mass communications, it was Carey who was one of the academics most credited
for the North American flavor of cultural studies that found its way into communications
and media studies classrooms in the U.S.
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A Decidedly “Ethnocentric” View: Carey and North American Cultural Studies
Carey took inspiration from a wide variety of scholars, including the work of
British academics such as Raymond Williams and Richard Hoggart, members of the
Chicago School of Sociology such as John Dewey, Robert Park, and Charles Cooley, as
well as the American anthropologist Clifford Geertz, to name a few. His idea was to
create a multi-disciplinary approach to what was by its nature a very large, if not vague,
topic. In an interview published in 2006, Carey described what he meant in his original
proposal for the creation of cultural studies:
Cultural Studies was then little more than a term to describe the perceived
commonalities in the work of Joe Gusfield, Jay Jensen, Erving Goffman, Thomas
Kuhn, symbolic interactionism and the Chicago School of Sociology, Kenneth
Burke, Leslie Fiedler and a small group of literary critics, and, of course, Marshall
McLuhan and Harold Innis, along with those Marxists willing to associate with a
group largely affiliated in opposition to positivism and positive science. This was
a strange group to patch together, against their will if they know about it, but
nevertheless I carved out a section of proseminar under the label “cultural
studies.82
The group he wanted to patch together was so large and diverse, representing such a vast
area of inquiry and theoretical perspectives that it threatened to dissolve the boundaries of
Carey’s discipline completely. But given Carey’s views about academic boundaries in the
first place, he would most likely have greeted such criticism with a shrug. Carey’s move
in the beginning was explicitly tactical; his picking of a such a general term, “Cultural
Studies,” for his program of study was meant to be as all encompassing as possible in
order to mount a successful attack on positive social science.
As Carey recalled in a reflective essay published in 1997, his chosen name for his
approach, “cultural studies,” was meant to seem “innocent”; he meant that, in the
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beginning, at least, he had no definite program in mind and was attracted to the
impartiality of the term. The name was an allusion to Max Weber’s “cultural science,”
but of course the word “science” had little appeal to Carey. Carey chose “cultural
studies” instead of “cultural science” because he did not want to pick a word that had
already been taken by those he wished to contest. So “cultural studies” became his term
for a very speculative enterprise. It was speculative because, at first, Carey had only one
real goal: to shift the direction of the discipline of journalism and mass
communications.83
Carey began forming his conception of cultural studies by reading the “usual
suspects,” members of what came to be the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies at
the University of Birmingham, founded by Richard Hoggart and his colleagues in 1964.
One of the founding texts of this uniquely British cultural approach was Hoggart’s The
Uses of Literacy published in 1957, a semi-autographical work that examined the role the
contemporary popular literature of the working class in England in its forming a culture
and a working class identity. The book was a break from traditional literary studies of
“high culture.” Hoggart demonstrated that there was an authentic working class culture
that deserved academic attention. One of the major topics of this now classic text was
how a more authentic working class literary culture came to be threatened by an invading
American popular culture. Hoggart’s approach was significant because his analysis broke
away from traditional left wing accounts (Hoggart called these accounts “middle class
Marxist” interpretations) of the working class that either pitied or patronized them.
Hoggart’s self-reflection on his relationship to his subjects was a marked aspect of his
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brand of cultural studies that one also sees in Carey’s work.84
Carey admired very much Hoggart and his Centre’s approach, beginning with its
avoidance of the term “mass communication” to identify its scholarly subjects. In his
essay “Mass Communications and Cultural Studies,” originally published in 1977, Carey
gave a lengthy exposition on the reasons that Raymond Williams, and by extension he
himself, avoided the term mass communication in an attempt to refocus their attention on
the broader topic of media and culture. Williams avoided the term because it was too
specialized towards mass media like broadcast television, film, and popular literature, all
of which were communications that come from a very specific modern and commercial
context, and avoided the common realms of speech and writing. Besides this narrow
focus, the use of the word “mass,” most importantly for Carey, limited the questions that
could be put towards these topics of media and culture.85 As Carey put it, “because the
audience was a mass, the only question worth asking was how, and then whether, film,
television, or books influenced or corrupted people.”86
Yet for all of the influence that British cultural studies had on Carey’s thinking,
Carey was determined that his version of cultural studies have a distinctive North
American foundation. His argument for this “ethnocentrism” was straightforward. For
Carey, the work of scholars like Marx, Weber, Raymond Williams, Stuart Hall, and
Richard Hoggart came from a distinctive time, national formation, and cultural context, a
context in which they were embedded and, for Carey, had to be understood. In Carey’s
approximation, it was the “ethnocentrism” of Hoggart and Williams – or rather, that their
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work was embedded in, and acknowledging of, a local cultural context – that added to
the strength of their claims. This characteristic of their scholarship allowed them to adjust
to local circumstances.87
Carey never changed in his position that an effective cultural study must begin its
investigation with an appreciation of the cultural uniqueness of the nation state in
question. To this point, Carey wrote that “the natural home of cultural studies, at least
within ‘developed cultures,’ is the nation state.”88 This was not nationalism but more or
less common sense. That nations differ in natural resources, theology, cultural attitudes,
and political circumstances is obvious. Carey, for example, citied the “tragic situation of
African Americans” in the United States, a claim that needs no review here, as one of the
many unique aspects of American culture that must be taken into account should one seek
to understand the culture’s predicament.89 To examine culture, then, one must begin with
the acknowledgment that the situation is both complex and difficult to generalize, and
that it is typically a localized phenomenon contingent on local understandings and
practice.
This “ethnocentrism” led Carey to turn to North American thinkers to begin
building an American version of cultural studies akin to Hoggart’s Centre for
Contemporary Cultural Studies. This point of view led him to unearth elements from the
famous University of Chicago’s school of sociology as he searched for a distinctly North
American starting point. As discussed in the previous chapter, Carey’s alternative history
of communications research inserted the “Chicago School of Sociology” (Carey’s
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reference to the work of Dewey, Park, and Cooley) as the genesis of a more complete
version of the history of research into media and society. The so-called “Chicago School”
and its symbolic interactionism, including a considerable influence from the work of John
Dewey, provided the backbone for Carey’s version of cultural studies that he wished to
be carried forward.
Indeed, Carey’s own critical analysis of American journalism was a throw back to
a unique blend of pragmatism, symbolic interactionism, and historical criticism that was
indebted to the work of Chicago School pragmatists like George Herbert Mead in the first
part of the twentieth century. Symbolic interactionism views human beings as uniquely
capable of creating, manipulating, and interpreting symbols in order to communicate
what are complex ideas of culture and history. Within this theory, humans are seen as
necessarily interactive; there is no solitary self because the self’s formation takes place in
relation to others and exterior systems of symbols. Erving Goffman, for instance,
examined the seemingly simple process of an individual walking into a room of others,
and concluded that the intricate processes of impression management involved on behalf
of the person walking into the room and the others looking on him gave the “self” a fluid,
complicated, and dialectic character contingent on social circumstances.90
Accepting of this a priori notion of the interactionist self, Carey’s critique of
contemporary journalistic practices, for example, stemmed from his theoretical
standpoint that a stable society must exist in a comprehensible symbolic environment. As
Carey understood it, journalists were “active participants” in the creation of this symbolic
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reality who were nevertheless frequent victims of the forces around them rather than
being the steady stalwarts of the public interest, as they commonly believed. Carey’s
critique of the contemporary situation was that American journalism had evolved, for
various reasons both ideological and institutional, to a state limited to the transmission of
incoherent, ephemeral, and disconnected information. Carey described this ephemeral
information environment nicely when he wrote that “everything seems to have the life
span of a butterfly in spring.”91 Given this situation, American journalism increasingly
did not provide coherent explanations or narrative detail necessary to provide an
individual with an accurate sense of the political and cultural world that surrounds him,
or address the persistent structural realties of class, race, and gender that are always
lurking beneath the news of the day.92 Therefore, such a problem becomes salient when
one acknowledges the necessity of interaction with one’s symbolic environment with
one’s formation of the self.
In addition to his indebtedness to the Chicago School and its symbolic
interactionism, Carey drew much from cultural anthropology. The next most important
source of inspiration for Carey’s cultural studies was Clifford Geertz. Geertz, a cultural
anthropologist, was one of the strongest voices in Carey’s essays along with John Dewey
and Harold Innis. Geertz’s methods drew from the Weberian verstehen tradition (a
German word that translates loosely to understanding), which sought meaning through
interpretation and empathy. Geertz, in a comment Carey was fond of quoting, used a
metaphor to explain what this process of interpretation involved. As Geertz put it, “man
is an animal suspended in webs of significance he himself has spun.” Geertz took
91

Carey, “The Dark Continent of American Journalism,” in James Carey: A Critical Reader, 187.

92

Ibid.,144-188.

46

“culture to be those webs.”93 And his goal was to search for meaning in these cultural
webs and interpret the processes within them, or, as he put it, “[i]t is explication that I am
after, construing social expressions on their surface enigmatical.”94
Following Geertz, Carey’s methods for analyzing culture also borrowed heavily
from the verstehen tradition and also from Geertz’s well-known technique of “thick
description.” Geertz wrote, “[Alfred North] Whitehead once offered to the natural
sciences the maxim ‘Seek simplicity and distrust it’; to the social sciences he might well
have offered ‘Seek complexity and order it.’”95 In much of his work, Carey took this
advice. Carey’s cultural approach to media and communications sought an understanding
of the complex web of human communications that was both historically grounded and
interpretive. Carey was not a historian of course, he was a philosophically minded
essayist that incorporated an eclectic synthesis of academic literature in his own
scholarship that appreciated and even took delight in the complexity of culture.
Much of Carey’s brand of American cultural studies involved what Neil Postman
and Charles Weingartner called the “anthropological perspective,” which “allows one to
be a part of his own culture and, at the same time, to be out of it.”96 Richard Hoggart’s
The Uses of Literacy, for example, was written from this point of view in that it analyzed
working class culture empathically on its own terms. In Carey’s discussion of cultural
studies, this perspective was implicitly the point of view that underlined the methods and
processes that Carey felt an investigator into society, culture, and its media should take.
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This anthropological perspective, or rather ability to remove oneself enough from the
surrounding culture in order to see it more clearly, provided the lens through which Carey
viewed the intellectual history of the discipline of mass communications. The dialogic
character of Carey’s work––it was both critically introspective and engaging––provides a
good example of the type of positionality that an observer should take when searching for
cultural meanings when surrounded by that very culture. For example, Carey’s essays on
the “effects tradition” were written by a scholar that took his very discipline as his subject
and engaged in an empathetic conversation on methods and ways of knowing much the
same way an anthropologist like Geertz looked on a cockfight, that is, both from within
and from outside of it.
Although, if searching for meaning and understanding sounds rather vague,
without predetermined steps or methods for inquiry, this is because this is largely the
case; as Carey put it, cultural studies has “far more modest objectives than other
traditions. It does not seek to explain human behavior in terms of the laws that govern it
or to dissolve it in the structures that underlie it; rather, it seeks to understand it.”97 This
was a distinctly interpretative enterprise. Understanding is much different from the goal
of behavior modification or a search for natural laws; there are no experiments that can
be performed on a culture in order to diagnose it, as Carey put it.98 Interpretation is more
of an artful process, and one that must necessarily rely on a liberal arts education in
literature, philosophy and, history to be successful. In this way, Carey was attempting to
shift the ground on which the conversation about methodology in the social sciences was
taking place.
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However, Carey did not leave his readers without an example as to how an
investigation in cultural studies might proceed. His well-known discussion of an ersatz
conversation about death served as his most trenchant example of the use of the verstehen
tradition. Carey asked his reader to imagine a conversation between four people about the
nature of death and when it takes place. First, Carey gave us the example of the
contemporary physician who determined that death took place as soon as the brain waves
ceased. Then, there was the typical middle American who argued that death occurred
when the heart stopped beating. Then there was the Irish peasant who argued with the
former two that death did not occur until three days after the cessation of the heartbeat,
when the person had been completely removed from the community. And finally, there
was the tribal mountain man who said that death occurred seven days before the cessation
of the heartbeat, right at the moment food could not be found.99
Carey’s point was to challenge his readers to think critically and expansively
about the problems of interpreting human phenomenon. The point was to first “undress”
the scene or “text,” that is, to remove the words and read the actions of how the death was
assessed (the measuring of the brain waves or heartbeat) as a text. The point was to treat
the phenomenon as a collection of symbolic actions, in order to understand what was
taking place. If the peasant did not believe that death had occurred until the body was
carried away, the point was not to find a causal variable for his mistaken belief but to
interpret the setting and context of his belief and then to understand it by engaging it.
A fuller example of such understanding and interpretation can be found in
Geertz’s famous analysis of a Balinese cockfight. Consider the following analysis:
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What sets the cockfight apart from the ordinary course of life, lifts it from the
realm of everyday practical affairs, and surrounds it with an aura of enlarged
importance is not, as functionalist sociology would have it, that it reinforces status
discriminations (such reinforcement is hardly necessary in a society where every
act proclaims them), but that it provides a metasocial commentary upon the whole
matter of assorting human beings into fixed hierarchical ranks and then
organizing the major part of the collective existence around that assortment. Its
function, if you want to call it that, is interpretive: it is a Balinese reading of
Balinese experience, a story they tell themselves about themselves.100
This purely interpretive analysis of the meaning of the Balinese cockfight situated it
within a social context and explained it without reducing it to a cause and effect analysis.
In addition, notice that it explicitly avoids the functionalist sociological analysis of the
type that would have emphasized the role of the cockfight in forming a consensus for the
proper functioning of the larger community. This nuanced analysis showcases Geertz’s
method of interpreting the meaning of the cultural practice “as a story they [the Balinese]
tell themselves about themselves,” in this case a cockfight, by finding the underlying
meaning of the practice at first not visible through mere observation, but made visible by
contemplation and interpretation.
The Transmission/Ritual Views of Communications
The most well-known concept of Carey’s unique brand of cultural studies was of
course his famous ritual/transmission binary. This binary is an overall theme for his
cultural media analysis and embodied his analysis of the way media systems, technology,
and content were conceived in the U.S. Contained within this binary is both criticism of
the transmission model of communications research and advocacy of an alternative path
in the ritual model of communications research. Carey’s ritual view is marked by a
unique intellectual optimism.
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For Carey, the lived reality of a community was a mutually formed creation by
individual actors in conversation with one another.101 This “ritual view of
communication” celebrates the fact that social reality is created within the symbolic
interaction of a community. Carey’s friend and student Lawrence Grossberg aptly
described the ritual view in this way: “[t]he concept of ritual communication drew upon
the common roots of communication, community and communion, to explore the ways
communication constituted symbolic reality but also defined common ways of living and
participating in that reality with others.”102 One can see here the clear relationship
between Carey’s ritual view and that of the symbolic interactionism of the Chicago
School. To demonstrate how a ritual view of communication might inform the actual
analysis of communication, Carey offered the problem of studying newspaper reading:
A ritual view of communication will focus on a different range of problems in
examining a newspaper. It will, for example, view reading a newspaper less as
sending or gaining information and more as attending a mass, a situation in which
nothing new is learned but in which a particular view of the world is portrayed
and confirmed.103
In other words, human communication, in this case, reading a newspaper, is a habitual
and ritualistic practice that both proscribes and establishes the conditions of lived reality-i.e., the shared social, cultural, and political meaning among its members. According to
Carey, the newspaper gives its audiences confirmation about the social world rather than
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supplying them with a false consciousness from which they must escape. For Carey, the
news is not information but drama, habitually consumed and negotiated.
Within the ritual view of communications, Carey emphasizes the importance of
community, participation, communion, and conversation for societal maintenance and
replication. Much of Carey’s work thus seems to embody Dewey’s nostalgia for and
idealism about the small town, middle class community. Absent from Carey’s ritual view
is the language of power and domination found in much of the critical literature in mass
communications regarding the United States, its culture, and its media. Carey favored the
insights and optimism found in Dewey over the emphasis on conflict and exploitation
found in Marx.
Although Carey was criticized for not properly addressing issues of power in his
cultural approach to media studies, he understood that power plays an important role in
any study of the mass media, even though many of these issues faded quickly into the
background in much of his own work. Nevertheless, he argued, for example, that in
matters concerning interpersonal communications, the political is less salient and easily
avoided, but that this is “[n]ot so with the mass media, where questions of political power
and institutional change are inescapable and usually render hopelessly ineffective the
standard cookbook recipes retailed by the graduate schools.”104 These “recipes” were the
standard quantitative methods taught in the effects tradition, which Carey was well aware
avoided integral questions about institutions and politics.
A careful reader might see in Carey’s original essay that formulated the ritual
view the intellectual lineage of the ideals of Deweyan participatory democracy. Dewey
104

Carey, “Reconceiving ‘Mass’ and ‘Media’,” 53.

52

believed that democracy ethically obligates its members to promote and establish
communities where resources are available for all individuals to realize their full
capacities and where all are afforded the opportunity to bring these capacities to fruition
through active participation in political and cultural life.105 The need for an individual’s
active participation in political, social, and cultural life is axiomatic in Carey’s ritual view
of communication and thus his view of an ethical democracy. Within the ritual view, to
begin an analysis of communication with an emphasis on ritual and community is to
privilege, in Carey’s words, “the oral formation of culture” rather than “technological
forms of transmission.”106 In other words, Carey used a conversation as a metaphor for
the ethical principles of a democratic community that are realized by the active and equal
participation of the public in conversation with one another. According to John Dewey,
this participation, based in communal life with an active acknowledgement of others,
provides “[t]he clear consciousness of a communal life, in all its implications, [that]
constitutes the idea of democracy.”107
In later work, Carey acknowledged that the ritual view of communication was
mainly his response to a conceptualization of communications within the behavioral
sciences “as a form of transmission for the pursuit of power (influence was what it was
called) or the release of anxiety.”108 Carey asserted famously that the transmission view
of communication had dominated intellectual approaches to mass communications in the
postwar United States. Within Carey’s binary, the view of communications as a social
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ritual is in dialectical opposition to its transmission counterpart; where the ritual view
sees communications as social maintenance and creation, the transmission view sees it as
social management and conquest over geography.
With an emphasis on spatiality, temporality, and their conquest and management,
the transmission view of communication concentrates efforts on the efficient transport of
messages and information over a vast geography for the purposes of persuasion,
socialization, and behavior modification. This view of communication is congruous with
a vertically integrated communications system, in which elite opinions are broadcast for
consumption by a mass public and the progress of the country can be measured
empirically by opinions that are thus successfully managed. Intellectually, the
transmission view concerns itself with research that focuses on the effects that messages
have on the receiver—for example, the “effects tradition” of mass communications
research. This form of effects research, embodied in the positivist, quantitative research
model in mass communications, owes much to the legacy of Paul Lazarsfeld whose work
pulled communications into the realm of psychology more than any other.109 Carey’s
work wanted to make central a more empathetic process research, even if to more jaded
readers his advocacy of a more democratic community may seem quixotic in the face of
sustained attacks by neo-liberal forms of capitalist development on such communities.
Carey, Cultural Studies, and Power
As might be obvious by now from my discussion of Carey’s brand of cultural
studies, the type of research that Carey wrote himself and advocated for was not
explicitly political. Unlike much of the work done in a more leftist tradition from the
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likes of Stuart Hall and others at the Centre of Contemporary Culture, and much of the
work done from continental thinkers like Foucault and Althusser, Carey essentially
wanted to avoid a cultural studies that could be clearly identified as coming from an
explicit political ideology. Throughout much of his life, Carey viewed Marxism and work
in political economy in general with a constant skepticism. This skepticism was the result
of a number of factors, some personal and some intellectual.
This is not to say that Carey disdained work in the Marxist tradition. He was no
friend to neoliberal forms of capitalism and the effects of the privatization of media on
the democratic forms of dialogue he admired.110 Carey was clearly a man of the Left if
we must pick labels. His work was parallel with Innis, and others, in that it contained a
critical point of view that admonished the imperial aspects of the economics of mass
communications and the effects tradition of research. Yet Carey, for the most part, was
careful to avoid traditional Marxist language and theoretical positions about ideological
superstructures because he was uncomfortable making class or the issues of power
relations in society the central point of analysis.
Therefore, for all Carey’s radical views towards positivist research traditions, his
politics were not explicitly radical. Carey wanted to uphold many of the traditions of
western liberalism and democratic community that many Marxists ignored or, in terms of
western liberalism with its market economies, would have been content to let fade away.
Carey admired the emphasis on community he found in Innis and Dewey, and he chose to
focus his efforts on the possibility of a revival of democratic communities rather than on
how they were being attacked. Carey’s real target for his cultural studies was positivism
in the social sciences, not the asymmetrical power relations in his society.
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Carey’s personal reasons for his skepticism towards Marxism must be accounted
for. But before these personal reasons are discussed, it is important to point out that
reading the details of an author’s biography into that author’s work is always fraught with
potential errors. To try to find elements of Carey’s biography in his theoretical positions
risks simplifying his arguments and making connections that Carey would have never
endorsed or intended. Nevertheless, Carey’s comments concerning his relationship to
Marxism were revealing. They seem related, if only in a tentative way, to his more
theoretical critiques of cultural studies that took inspiration from the Marxist and neoMarxist traditions.
The comments in question took place in an interview with Lawrence Grossberg in
2006. Grossberg began his line of questioning by asking Carey if his relationship to
Marxism was affected by former Marxist professors whom Carey did not remember
fondly. In Carey’s view, these professors were perfectly willing to engage in fiery
revolutionary rhetoric in academic circles while relying on others to go out and risk their
bodies for these political ideals.111 While Carey acknowledged that his views on Marxism
were certainly shaped by former Marxist professors, he suggested that the tension
between himself, Marxism, and his theories of culture came from an early experience he
had as child in terms of Marxism and religion. Carey recounted this experience in the
following way:
I’m really attributing a mature thought to an immature mind; I understand that.
But, I know that the old IWW I came to admire later on, and my family admired,
had the slogan that said ‘If you don’t come in on Sunday, don’t come in on
Monday,’ meaning Sunday does not belong to the church but to the party. That
was the attitude of the Communist party as well. And, like Stuart Hall much later,
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I think that was a gross misunderstanding of the practical role religion at large
played in people’s lives. Where to hold political meetings? We held them in the
basement of the church. I mean, it was the only space available to us. I mean, they
gave space to the Communist Party to come harangue us when they wished to do
that. But, religion answered, in addition to metaphysical questions like what
happens to me after I’m gone; it answered questions like: How do you bury the
dead? How do you consecrate the ground? How do you retain memory of people?
These are practical questions when your grandparents are dying, and you have to
ask, how are we going to do this? The CP had no answer for that.112
Carey went on to explain that his family members were not dogmatic, theological
Catholics. Instead, he referred to his family as “ritual Catholics,” meaning that they found
a certain level of satisfaction by participating in the rituals of their church and its
organization.113 Carey and his family needed religious rituals to produce meaning and
comfort during difficult times. There is nothing pedantic or theoretical to point out about
such matters; Carey was merely pointing to a fact of ordinary life which religion was able
affect positively. Marxism’s explicit dismissiveness of this practical application of
religion made Carey suspicious of it throughout his career.
Carey, however, was not dismissive of Marxism, which is evident by the
sophisticated criticism he leveled at it. Such criticisms could have only been produced by
someone who confronted the claims of Marxism directly. In terms of his personal views,
Carey’s religious background left him feeling that Marxism was without an adequate
theory of religion and the purposes it served. As he became an academic, Carey’s views
on religion were shaped greatly by Emile Durkheim and his book The Elementary Forms
of Religious Life. For his part, Durkheim took religion more seriously than Marx and
considered it to be an important aspect of social maintenance, unlike in Marxism, where
religion served merely as an opiate that numbed people to social conflict. Writing in
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1915, Durkheim observed that “religious representations are collective representations
which express collective realities.”114 This view of religion, as a collective expression of
social meaning, permeated Carey’s ritual view of communication and informed his views
of symbolic interactionism as well.
Carey’s critique of Marxism and media theorists that drew from political
economic analysis was that these forms of analysis were reductionist; they reduced
culture to ideology and analyzed society on purely economic foundations. Carey
believed that the analysis of economic Marxism and American political economists
simply could not adjust to local circumstances because they attempted to view culture
through the lens of economic laws that applied to both everyone and no one in particular;
in this way, Carey’s critiques of Marxism paralleled his critique of the search for the
natural laws of society in positivist social science.
Carey felt that the strength of American cultural studies overcame the limitations
of political economic analysis because of its “ethnocentrism”:
The strength of cultural studies, of the revolt against formalism and economistic
Marxism, was precisely, I want to insist, this ethnocentrism. Intellectual work,
including both cultural studies and political economy, is always and everywhere
decisively touched and shaped by the national formation (along with class, race,
gender, and so forth) within which it is produced…Nothing discredited Marxism
more than its rigid inability to adapt to local circumstances, which meant in
practice an inability to understand local knowledge whether of a religious,
familial, aesthetic, or political sort.115
In a deliberate attempt to show the importance of such local circumstances, Carey relied
on no less of an authority than Karl Marx himself to point to the unique cultural situation
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of the United States. Carey quoted Marx’s comment about the religious impulse in
American life: “[t]he feverish youthful movement of material production, which has to
make a new world of its own, has left neither time nor opportunity from abolishing the
old world spirit.”116 As Carey pointed out, Marx expected this old world spirit to fade
away, but of course, it never has. Carey used Marx to show contemporary Marxists that
their analysis should take into account cultural aspects that even Marx himself
understood.
Indeed, Carey had a point about the inflexibility of some of the Marxist inspired
political economic analysis and about the problematic reduction of culture to ideology.
Culture, for Carey, was much more than a false consciousness. Borrowing a metaphor for
T.S. Eliot, Carey considered culture to be like a spiritual organism that could only be
found in its specific context and not through an analysis of economic conditions.117
Nevertheless, for all his analytic power, Carey essentially avoided all questions of power
in its relationship to culture even though such questions are extremely important in our
contemporary situation. The contemporary attack by the neoliberal right on the interests
of the poor and the working class has taken place in the midst of one-sided class war
from the top on the classes below, and these trends must be understood in terms of both
political economy and culture.118 As Robert McChensey has pointed out, institutional
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factors make the market the “mortal enemy” of the very concepts of community that
Carey held in such high esteem. As McChesney put it, “[m]arkets encourage some of the
worst traits of humanity and discourage some of our best traits, including selflessness and
compassion.”119
Carey’s criticism of political economic analysis and its investigations of structural
forms of inequality did not fully comprehend the fact that cultural forms, while
important, are always already connected to material conditions and institutions. This is
not to say that material conditions determine culture in total, but to neglect the role of
power in American cultural studies is to miss a great deal of the interplay between
structural forms of American capitalism and the more spiritual forms of culture that take
place.
For example, in his well-known essay “The Problem of Journalism History”
published in 1974, Carey rightly criticized the traditional versions of journalism history
that celebrated the steady progression of technology across time and the great men of
history who pushed the enterprise forward. Carey wanted to refocus the study of
American journalism history on the “consciousness” that journalisms of the past analyzed
and represented. Carey described a cultural history of journalism in this way:
When we study the history of journalism we are principally studying a way in
which people in the past have grasped reality. We are searching out the
intersection of journalistic style and vocabulary, created systems of meaning, and
the standards of reality shared by writer and audience. We are trying to root out a
portion of consciousness.120
This form of analysis was essentially Carey’s advocacy of a history from the bottom up,
one that not only acknowledged the consciousness of the news creators but of the news
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consumers. Carey’s critique of the state of journalism history did not go unnoticed,
professional journalism historians responded to Carey’s call for a more cultural approach
to journalism history and debated how to “operationalize” his ideas. Indeed, digging for
the consciousness of a people is no easy task and Carey provided no concrete methods for
doing so. Nevertheless, as historian Richard Schwarzlose observed, “each time James W.
Carey turns his attention to the state of journalism history, his views stimulate, challenge,
maybe even threaten us. Patron saint or pest, Carey cannot be ignored.”121
Carey’s call for a more cultural approach to journalism history, and studies of
communications more generally, was certainly an admirable goal, especially considering
the dismal state of journalism history that Carey was criticizing in the early 1970s. But as
journalism historian David Paul Nord pointed out, such a study of cultural history was
weak in its attention to power because, unfortunately, the messages of the media do not
reach their audiences from the bottom up but from the opposite direction.122
It can be conceded that Carey’s anthropological notions of cultural studies, which
included the symbolic interactionism of the Chicago School, continue to be a necessary
form of analysis; the search for the consciousness of a people and an empathic
understanding of their practices and relationship to mass media is a deeply humane goal.
Nevertheless, Nord was correct in his observation that it would be a mistake to avoid the
traditional analysis of institutional structures of media and their histories. While Geertz
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was right that man found himself entangled in webs of meaning he himself had spun, as
Nord pointed out, this was only half of the story: “[t]he other part is that men and women
are suspended in webs spun by others.”123
Therefore, while Carey’s push for a cultural understanding of social meaning was
laudable, much of the “ethnocentric” forms of cultural studies he advocated were blind to
larger institutional factors. While it is important not to diminish the agency of an
audience in creating their own meanings through industrially produced products, there are
still unavoidable institutional factors that go into their production and the messages that
they contain. A political economic analysis shows the basis for material factors whose
gravitational pull can distort even the most authentic culture. While Carey was right to
seek out the meanings peoples attached to symbols, those symbols were still produced by
those with more power than those below them.
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CHAPTER 4
JAMES CAREY AND TECHNOLOGY
This final chapter will address Carey’s ideas about “technology and ideology.”
Much of Carey’s concern with communications technology sprang from his interest in the
work of Canadian academics Marshall McLuhan and Harold Innis and their analysis of
the various forms of communication media. Carey’s attention to technology and its
relationship to political culture, education, and the larger society is a major theme in his
scholarship. His work on technology included two important approaches: first a critical
approach, most notably in essays with co-author John Quirk, in which they provide an
iconoclastic critique of technology as an ideological category, what he and Quirk called
the “electronic sublime.” With this critical approach to technology, they sought to expose
the widespread belief that technology progresses naturally and independently towards
improving the human condition as a harmful cultural mythos.124 Second, in his analysis
of communications technology, like Innis before him, Carey focused on how the physical
structure of a technology like the telegraph influenced its use and its effects on culture
and journalism. With this materialist analysis, Carey focused his attention on historical
changes in what Neil Postman called our “information environment,” the aggregate of
communication technologies that make up our symbolic world.
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Inquiries into the “media environment” are attempts to observe how changes in
that environment affect the ways we communicate and receive information. In his wellknown essay on the telegraph,125 Carey argued that the telegraph had “reworked the
nature of written language and finally the nature of awareness itself”126 and shifted
journalistic styles away from more long form, nuanced, and detailed news reporting in
favor of the transmission of bits of information. Put another way, for Carey the
introduction of the telegraph altered our information environment such that as the form
and style of messages sent over vast distances changed, our awareness of the world
changed along with it. In this chapter, I will outline, critique, and classify the origins of
Carey’s views on technology and how he integrated them in his specific brand of North
American cultural studies.
Innis, McLuhan, and Carey: The “Bias” of Technology
Carey’s analysis of communications technology, specifically the telegraph, was
rooted in a distinctly North American intellectual tradition sometimes called the Toronto
School. This school of thought most commonly refers to the work of the Canadian
scholars Harold Innis and Marshall McLuhan. Of the two, Innis was the greater influence
on Carey. Innis was a Canadian economist who became well known for his distinct brand
of communications theory that focused on what he called the spatial or temporal medium
“bias” in different communications technologies. This line of thought is sometimes
referred to as “medium theory,” and it refers to the effect of a communication medium’s
form on the information it presents, as well as a medium’s influence on political and
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cultural organization. Understanding Innis’s work on communications technology is
essential in understanding Carey’s own views on these topics. Not only did Carey write
extensively on Innis and his work, but he also borrowed much from Innis’ language and
theories in his own historical studies of the U.S. communications system. Of course,
although Innis’ brand of communications theory provided much of the background for
many of Carey’s ideas, there are also subtle differences that I will outline later in this
chapter.
Innis’s theories and methods for investigating medium “biases” greatly impressed
Carey. He wrote, “Innis’ work, despite its maddeningly obscure, opaque and elliptical
character, is the great achievement in communications on this continent.”127 Carey felt
that Innis had rescued communications research from becoming just another branch of
social psychology condemned to rely on methods taken from the natural sciences.128
Innis’ work, for Carey and others, represented an alternative route for inquiry that took
the middle road between the dominant forms of socio-scientific and behaviorist research
in mass communications in the U.S. and the postmodern forms of media and cultural
studies in Europe.129
Writing of Innis’ style and methodology, Carey praised it as a break from the
traditional scholarly style of linear presentation and precise argumentation with
something that was an “apparently disconnected kaleidoscope of fact and information”
that flashed before the reader a wide range of historical events separated by wide swaths

127

Carey, “Space, Time, and Communications,” 109.

128

Ibid., 114.

129

Megan Mullen, “Space Bias, Time Bias: Harold Innis, ‘Empire and Communications’,” Technology and
Culture 50 (2009): 177.

65

of time and geography.130 For Carey, such a wide ranging and seemingly fragmented
style of argumentation allowed Innis “to capture the complexities of social existence and
its multidimensional change.”131 This style, a kind of intellectual bombardment of facts
and observation, can also be found in the “thick description” ethnographies of Clifford
Geertz whose work was a heavily footnoted and interpretive analysis of events that
occurred around him. The “thick descriptions” of Geertz and intellectual “kaleidoscopes”
of Innis appealed to Carey’s literary sensibilities, in particular, his desire for detail and
the acknowledgment of social questions resistant to quantitative answers and certain
solutions.
But most importantly perhaps, Innis’ work represented for Carey a turning away
from any pretense of a “value free” inquiry into human communications. Much of Innis’s
work contained an implicit, at times explicit, critique of his own society. Innis, in other
words, wrote from a point of view. Innis castigated the nature of North American
imperialism and its monopolies of knowledge; he was critical of the effects of
mechanization and the undue power it gave specialized groups at the expense of others;
and he called for universities to reevaluate their role in society in order to confront the
problems of Western society.132 Innis approached his subjects with an implied desire for a
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more humane society. Although this desire was sometimes concealed by his abstruse
language and difficult scholarly prose, Carey very much admired Innis’ critical stance
and humane desires. Carey wrote at length of how such a critical viewpoint separated
Innis from the majority of postwar North American scholarship on communications, and
how it came to influence the contemporary critical scholarship that was to come.133 What
Carey found in Innis was a congenial mind and a new vocabulary for investigating
technological change and human communication. As mentioned above, a fuller
understanding of Carey’s brand of technological criticism requires a basic understanding
of Innis’ concepts; in the following pages, I will review these foundational ideas.
Innis’ work in his Bias of Communication was a distinctive cultural approach to
“media effects” research. His inquires focused on macro-historical trends in different
ancient cultures such as the Egyptian empire and the city-states of Greece, and he
examined the changes in the dominant mediums of communications in these civilizations
and the political and cultural effects of these changes. He proposed that dominant
communication mediums were central to these civilizations and that their respective
“biases” determined the type of political systems and social organizations that took hold
in a given culture. In this way, Innis was a conspicuous technological determinist; this
fact was not lost on Carey, but Carey and other scholars bracketed this aspect of Innis’s
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work, justly or not, focusing instead on the originality of Innis’ observations.134
Technological determinism is most often used as a pejorative because it implies
an unnecessary reduction of human affairs to a single causal factor, in this case a
technical form, and names it as the driver of social change. Indeed, some of Innis’ claims
about dominant communications mediums—in particular, his claim that the inherent
biases of a given technology determined the characteristics of a civilization—were most
likely overstated. And the fact that Innis focused very heavily on the civilizations of
antiquity for which there was less verifiable evidence than more current examples was a
weakness of his methodology. For example, Innis claimed that the “[t]he discovery of
printing in the middle of the fifteenth century implied the beginning of a return to a type
of civilization dominated by the eye rather than the ear.”135 Such a claim is intuitively
pleasing but verification of historical literacy rates are notoriously difficult to ascertain.
In addition, the adoption of a technology by a large number of people cannot be
explained solely by the introduction of a new technology; historical studies of popular
literacy in England in the sixteenth century and beyond, for example, suggest that
individual reasons for learning to read were myriad and generally involved a motivation
for access to the social world and information that print made available.136 Nevertheless,
Innis’ intense focus on the social effects of communications mediums encouraged new
and ambitious historical research that was both analytically inventive and culturally
resonant in a society seeking answers in the midst of its own transition to electronic
communications. Innis’ major contribution was to illuminate changes in the present by
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examining those in the past. It is for these reasons that thinkers like James Carey,
Marshall McLuhan, Neil Postman, and others venerated his work.
The physical form of a communications medium was important to Innis because,
as he put it, “[t]he relative emphasis on time or space will imply a bias of significance to
the culture in which it is imbedded.”137 Innis argued that communications mediums could
be placed on a continuum based on their bias toward the control of either time or space.
Innis understood that civilizations were appraised by their duration and control over
territory, and so he argued that a communication medium’s bias towards either control
over time or space would determine the character of its ruling institutions. A dominant
medium’s “bias,” for Innis, affected the nature of the authorities that made use of the
medium and the manner by which these authorities disseminated and controlled technical
information. He called these forces “knowledge monopolies.” Innis examined in detail
how new communications technologies tore apart old knowledge monopolies and
replaced them with new ones. For Innis, technological change was not politically neutral;
new technical apparatuses gave power to groups that were skilled in their use and
manipulation, while taking power away from groups skilled in older technologies made
obsolete by newer ones.138
Innis explained medium “bias” using the example of a stone carving. The carving
was a form of media that was not easily transportable but was durable and long lasting;
therefore, the carving was “biased” towards a temporal orientation rather than a spatial
one. A stone carving’s messages were sent through time rather than space; the
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communicative power of a carving rested on its messages to posterity. Thus, this timebiased medium was useful for the maintenance of tradition and a shared history. A timebiased communications system had less capacity for the expansion of secular authority
through space, Innis argued. It was better suited for the continuation of hierarchy and
religion rather than empire. On the other hand, the essential features of space-biased
mediums, like paper and papyrus, were that they were light and transportable and thus
better suited for the management of large areas. According to Innis, space-biased media
were essential to the establishment of secular bureaucracies charged with the
management of the state’s affairs and its territory. A civilization’s over reliance on spacebiased media conferred a “bias of significance” towards the conquering of space and
hence the establishment of an empire. Carey interpreted this time bias/space bias
taxonomy to mean that the “dynamic of social change” could be found in a type of search
for alternative modes of communication between those supporting the “kingdom of God
or man” respectively.139
To illustrate these concepts more concretely, a brief review of Innis’ analysis of
ancient Egypt and how he applied the concept of technological “bias” to his historical
interpretations is necessary. Innis examined the changes in communications mediums in
the ancient Egyptian empire and argued that changes in their dominant forms of
communications led to the decline of the autocratic monarchy. Innis chose autocratic
Egypt as the archetypal “time-biased” civilization because the divine monarchy had
emerged as the unified force that was necessary to utilize the periodic flooding of the
Nile. The Egyptian religious authorities that controlled the knowledge of astronomy, the
calendar, and related time-biased media became that culture’s emergent knowledge
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monopoly. With control of such knowledge, the priestly class monopolized the means
necessary to predict the river’s flooding, the cornerstone of ancient Egypt’s agricultural
economy.140 Thus, the autocratic authorities of Egypt became heavily concerned with the
management of time, continuity, ritual, and religion––and, according to Innis, overly
reliant on time-binding media.
The resulting time-biased information environment in Egypt culminated in the
erection of the pyramids and the mummification process that emphasized the monarch’s
immortality. Yet the “monopoly of knowledge” held by a priestly class that was
technically proficient in complex hieroglyphs and their time-biased mediums, such as
stone carvings and pyramids, came to be challenged by increasing competition from
paper and papyrus that were lighter and more easily transported. As the use of papyrus
increased, so did written culture, and this led to the emergence of a professional class of
scribes concerned with the bureaucratic necessities of the state and increased more
secular forms of thinking. The practicality and usefulness of papyrus eventually took the
“monopoly of knowledge” away from the priestly class and situated it in a more secular
bureaucracy concerned with the expansion of secular authority and the administration of
political power through space. Innis’ major thesis was that changes in communication
media had the effect of diminishing the power of the religious authorities and increasing
those of the state.
It is important to point out that Innis did not favor time-biased media over spacebiased media or vice versa. For Innis, mediums competed for cultural domination. I have
bracketed many of the dense historical details of Innis’ time bias/space bias continuum,
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but Innis’s major point was that a culture’s reliance on one medium of communication
over the other (spatial or temporal) put a culture in a state of imbalance.141 Innis
understood that all civilizations were shaped by time and space bias, but he emphasized
the necessity for balance or equilibrium. In Innis’ terms, the bias of one communications
technology could be counterbalanced by the bias of another. This idea that civilizations
required some sort of equilibrium appealed to Innis’ sensibilities as an economist and it
was a residue of the “society as a social organism” metaphor that was characteristic of the
thought of sociologists such as Robert Park and Charles Cooley, who were scholars at the
University of Chicago when Innis was a student there.142 Yet, as Carey correctly pointed
out, Innis’ work was a turn away from the more romantic aspects of the University of
Chicago School Of Sociology’s “society as organism” metaphor that glazed over
historical facts of the asymmetrical power relations inherent to imperial civilizations.143
Carey was greatly influenced by Innis’ concept of the intimate relationship
between space-biased media and empire. Carey, for example, pointed out that the first
uses of writing and printing were not in the high-minded matters of literature, holy books
and art, but rather in the practical matters of bookkeeping and in imperial matters of
warfare, empire, and the state.144 Printing and its space-binding capacity, for Carey,
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“encouraged the coordinated and systematic expansion of European empires.”145
Therefore, following Innis, Carey sought to remind his readers that printing and writing
came with both positive and negative consequences, encouraging expression while at the
same time encouraging the expansion of authority and empire.
Speaking of newer technologies such as satellites and cable television Carey
commented that “[w]e are witnessing the imperial struggle of the early age of print all
over again but now with communications systems that transmit messages at the extremes
of the laws of physics.”146 Like Innis, for Carey our society’s overreliance on spacebiased media reveled a new consolidation of powerful forces, such as the even larger
federations of power growing out of the nations-state in that of multinational
corporations. As he put it “multinationals could not exist without jet planes, advanced
computers, and electronic communication.”147 Carey saw in electronics the possibility for
the “indefinite expansion of the administrative mentality and imperial politics.”148 Like
Innis, Carey was not optimistic about the changes he saw in his society and the
technologies that were becoming dominant. But the bias of media towards the forms of
authority that were encouraged was not the only form of analysis Carey utilized. Carey
also wrote about the more individual consequences of technological change drawing from
yet another, perhaps more well-known, Canadian scholar.
A somewhat similar notion of medium “bias” was also articulated in a less
historically detailed way in the work of the wildly charismatic Marshall McLuhan. The
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basic premise of his path-breaking book The Gutenberg Galaxy (1962) is that the
medium is more important than the content it presents: “the medium is the message.”
McLuhan argued that different mediums encourage different habits of mind; for example,
he argued that the invention of print encouraged people to consume information in a
linear, orderly fashion, while seated alone at a table, thus emphasizing individualism,
specialization, and linear forms of thinking. According to Carey’s articulation of this line
of argument, the printed page encourages a particular type of logic of experience, “the
desire to break things down into elementary units (words), the tendency to see reality in
discrete units, to find casual relations and linear serial order (left to right arrangement of
the page), [and] to find orderly structure in nature (the orderly geometry of the printed
page).”149 McLuhan theorized about the impact of a medium’s presentation on sensory
experience, but Carey ultimately rejected McLuhan’s argument, because he did not
believe that the effect of media on sensory organization was automatic or subliminal or
that it occurred without resistance.150 Carey was suspicious of McLuhan’s claims, but he
was nevertheless influenced by them when he claimed that the telegraph changed
language use and the “structures of awareness,”151 but such observations faded in his later
work as he came to focus more on technology’s larger social impact.152
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In the 1960s, McLuhan’s influence was small among the larger academic
community, although he was popular in the wider public. He viewed the emergence of
the electronic age as a welcome change and believed it encouraged the establishment of,
in his optimistic phrase, a new “global village.” The promise of electronic
communications for McLuhan was to tear down the obstacles to human interaction and
extend the human psyche through space. His work did influence the thought of some
scholars, including not only Carey but also the communications theorist Neil Postman
and the historian Elizabeth Eisenstein. Postman relied on McLuhan’s theories of medium
in his analysis of the impact of television on public discourse, an influence he saw as
being both corrosive and even dangerous.153 Eisenstein incorporated McLuhan’s theories
on medium as a starting point for her massive historical analysis of the wide-ranging
impacts of the printing press in Europe.154 Yet, these scholars differ from McLuhan in
their approach and conclusions; Eisenstein added historical rigor to McLuhan’s theories,
while both Carey and Postman incorporated his ideas in a way that deemphasized his
optimism concerning the positive social outcomes of newer electronic media.
Both Innis’ and McLuhan’s influence on Carey can be seen in his essay on the
impact of the telegraph. Carey argued that the telegraph encouraged the transmission of
bits of information––simple facts in “telegraphic” language––instead of long-form
essays. This form of soft form technological determinism, in which the structure of a
communications technology such as the printed page or the telegraph is believed to
influence intellectual habits, led Carey to inquire about the uses and “bias” of
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communications. He took from Innis and McLuhan the method of applying hermeneutic
insights to material objects in order to analyze the impact of communications
technologies and the deeper relationship between technology and ideology. But it was
Innis that was the stronger voice in Carey’s analysis; in Carey’s view, McLuhan was the
“fallen angel of the Harold Innis legacy.”155
McLuhan, for Carey, simplified the social impact of communications technology
by focusing primarily on the sensory consequences of communications technology. Even
though Carey’s analysis of the telegraph’s impact on journalistic style––in its favoring of
the concise transmission of telegraphic information––owed to McLuhan’s the “medium is
the message” thesis, this was not Carey’s major focus. As Carey put it, “[m]y argument is
simply that the most visible effects of communications technology were on social
organization rather than sensory organization.”156 Carey’s investigation of the telegraph
was thus primarily an Innisian work, which can be seen clearly in his comment that
“[w]ith the development of the railroad, stream power, the telegraph and cable, a coherent
empire emerged based on a coherent system of communication.”157 Carey ‘s focus on the
telegraph’s expansion and coordination of commercial, national, and imperial interests
was due to his internalization of Innis’ space bias of media, and from here he added his
own from of thought on technology as a ideological category.
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From Time/Space Bias to the Ritual/Transmission Binary
As I have already outlined, Innis’ work was a significant influence on Carey’s
thought. I have taken care to review Innis’ work on communications in order to begin to
show the level of influence Innis had on Carey’s concept of the transmission and ritual
views of communication and his attitude towards communications technology in general.
The relationship between Carey’s transmission/ritual binary and Innis’ medium “bias” is
not completely parallel, of course; Carey’s binary embraced two alternative views of
communication present in American society, while Innis’ concepts were more of an
analytic lens for examining the material dynamic of a communications medium and its
consequences. Nevertheless, thematically the concepts are closely related.
Both concepts––Innis’ space/time medium bias and Carey’s transmission/ritual
binary––divided communications into two realms: (1) the realm of the secular and the
state, and (2) the realm of ritual and the sacred. Furthermore, both concepts emphasized
the tension and competition between these two realms, but Carey held the necessity for
ritual’s role in the production of culture and social life in higher esteem than did Innis.158
Unlike Innis’ concepts, in Carey’s transmission and ritual binary, the ritual view served
as the antidote to the imperialism and desire for social control contained in the
transmission view. Whereas Innis hoped for equilibrium and balance, Carey hoped for a
paradigm shift.
Carey’s ritual view of communication highlighted the role of the prayer, the
chant, and the ceremony rather than the sermon or religious instruction because these
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communal actions emphasized one’s place in the larger whole.159 Notice that none of the
aforementioned acts of communication were technologically mediated but rather required
the presence of bodies, which was very important for Carey. From Carey’s perspective,
the embodied form of communication, by which he was referring to a conversation,
required a base level form of democracy as both speakers are required to acknowledge
one another in order for a conversation to take place. Carey argued that to emphasize the
importance of ritual in the study of communication forced one to focus on the “oral
formation of culture” because in ritual and conversation “signs have intrinsic agency” by
“embodying and acting out the claims symbols have on us.”160 A simpler way to put this
is to say that these forms of communication––conversation and rituals—encompass the
entire sensory capacity of a person simply because of the body’s necessary presence.
Moreover, like Innis, Carey privileged the oral tradition over printed and
electronic communications because technologically mediated communications like print
gave rise to syntactical complexity and specialization easily monopolized by small
groups. Oral traditions, on the other hand, could not be so monopolized.161 In much of
Carey’s technological criticism, then, one finds a romantic desire for a return to a more
oral culture in order to counterbalance the imperial “biases” of electronic media. Carey’s
emphasis on dialogue, conversation, and debate as the proper means for democratic
practice was also indebted to John Dewey. For Dewey, “[v]ision is a spectator; hearing is
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a participator.”162 He meant “vision” to refer to the reading of a newspaper and “hearing”
to refer to a dialogue between the members of a community. In Dewey’s formulation,
“social intelligence” was most effectively transferred by word of mouth because this form
of communication emphasized the need for not only a tightly woven local community but
also the greater participation of its members.163 Carey looked on such ideas fondly, for he
had the same veneration for community as Dewey. A firmly established practice of
democratic dialogue, in Carey’s view, remained safe from the influence of imperial
interests and commercialism, and it promoted a more primitive and necessary form of
equality.
When viewed in light of his privileging of the oral tradition, Carey’s analysis of
the invention of the telegraph, then, was based on a firmly critical foundation. The
invention of the telegraph marked the beginning of the modern era of communications;
for Carey, to perform an archeology of electric communications in the U.S. was to
uncover the telegraph beneath the subsequent “revolution” in telecommunications. Carey
understood that all communication technologies were built on the technologies that
preceded them, or as he put it, “when you peel back radio, you find the telephone;
telephone the telegraph; telegraph the railroad; railroad the canal and turnpike; and
beneath the turnpike early patterns of land and water commerce from the early days of
exploration.”164 In Carey’s analysis, it was the telegraph that began the major acceleration
of human triumph over space, and this acceleration culminated in the so-called
“electronic revolution” that only further emphasized American cultural tendencies for
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“expansion, spatial control, commercialism, and imperialism.”165 In this sense, drawing
from Carey’s observations, the “electronic revolution” was not a revolution at all, for it
merely extended the status quo rather than overturning it.
Carey argued that the telegraph was the technology that changed forever the way
communication was viewed in the American cultural context. The telegraph established
an essentially centrifugal force that “displaced older religious views of communications”
and replaced them with the secular views for transmission;166 using Innis’ terms, the
telegraph made for a new form of knowledge monopoly that served the interests of the
emerging forms of American state capitalism and increased the administrative powers of
the state and the coordination of its military. Carey’s emphasis on the “ritual view of
communications” as positive counterweight to the transmission view—embodied by the
telegraph and subsequent technologies—does not imply that Carey proselytized for the
expansion of organized religion as a solution to the secular forms of technocracy. He did
not. But he did express frustration at the culture’s overreliance on space-biased mediums
that minimized face-to-face interaction.167 Carey felt such face-to-face communication
was essential to a fully functioning democracy and the maintenance of fuller and more
authentic culture.
To younger readers, such a desire for a return to an oral culture might seem
unreasonable, if not overtly quixotic. In this way, Carey was unapologetically oldfashioned. He was also Hellenistic, as he admired the orality of ancient Homeric Greek
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culture.168 The oral culture of the ancient Greeks has, of course, disappeared, and the
advantages of a print culture gave rise to many of the modern advancements that we have
today. For instance, even though Carey admired his work,169 Ong was not a major
influence on Carey’s own scholarship. One reason for this was that Ong highly privileged
the advantages of literacy over those of orality. Like Carey, Ong understood the essential
communal nature of an oral culture and the alienation and necessary solitude inherent in
the ways of knowing embodied in the written and printed word; nevertheless, Ong argued
that literacy “is absolutely necessary for the development not only of science but also of
history, philosophy, explicative understanding of literature and of any art, and indeed for
the explanation of language (including oral speech) itself.”170 Also, it must be noted,
Eisenstein also interpreted the rise of print culture to be integral to the spread of western
forms of natural science––integral, because rationalism is embedded in the printed word
in the following way: the printed word is a demanding medium that requires the reader to
think in a linear fashion, slowly making judgments of truth and falsehood about the
claims being made before him in the text. To read takes a certain form of discipline that
requires of one to be seated at table and read in quiet contemplation.
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psychic effects of reading are to encourage rationality; to read is to reason. Additionally,
as to its social consequences, Ong argued that literacy intensified one’s sense of self and
that an enlarged sense of one’s being made for a “more conscious interaction between
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persons.”172 The expansion of consciousness that literacy encourages enlarged one’s
worldview and, in Ong’s view, made for more meaningful social interaction.
This is not to say that Carey explicitly denied the positive effects of print or other
space- biased media. As an academic, Carey himself was immersed in an information
environment heavily influenced and dominated by the biases of print. The truth claims of
print and exposition are heavily valued in academic circles and rest in the fact that in the
process of writing a document––such as the thesis before you––an author is forced to
place heavy consideration on the words used, the claims made, and the information
presented. Moreover, print makes it necessary for an author’s claims and the evidence for
them to be presented precisely and in a linear fashion. Carey’s thesis was that
technological change could not solve problems that were intrinsically political or cultural,
he paid close attention to technological change like McLuhan, Ong, and Innis before him,
but overall he chose to view these changes from a higher point of view in order to detail
its larger social impact.
Space-Biased Technology: Nationalism and Empire.
In terms of their historical impact on social consciousness, writing and printing
are the most important communication technologies inventions to date. Nevertheless, the
status of writing systems and the printed word as technologies has faded from view in the
age of telecommunications and more impressive electronic media. Writing and printing
have become seemingly natural parts of our daily lives. We forget that printing, writing,
and alphabets had to be invented, that children must be educated at a very early age in
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order become acclimated to these technologies.173 Yet printing and writing are
technologies with long histories, and much has been written about both their positive and
negative consequences.174
As to the negative consequences of print, for example, Carey was well aware of
the relationship between the rise of nationalism and the rise of print culture. Not only was
Carey informed by the “space bias” notion of Innis that tied a space-binding medium’s
form to the rise of statist imperial interests, but he was also informed by Elizabeth
Eisenstein’s McLuhanesque analysis of the effect of print culture on nationalism in
Europe. Eisenstein’s historical research pointed to the fact that typographic fixity had
made prominent the differences between the various “mother tongues” of Europe. The
standardization of vernaculars brought about by the printing press built “walls of
language” around territorial lines; in other words, changes brought about by the printing
press in sixteenth century Europe’s information environment planted the seeds of
nationalism by a purification process of national literary cultures.175 Similar observations
can be found in Benedict Anderson’s study of the origins of nationalism that linked
capitalism and print culture together as being integral to the establishment of a national
mode of consciousness.176 The invention of print conquered space in such a way as to
unify and divide along the lines of newly established discourse communities colored with
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the identity of the nation-state. In both Anderson and Eisenstein existed the type of
analysis that was the cousin of Carey’s insights into the unique culture of American
nationalism as the product of space-binding communications networks.
Carey’s analysis of American communications systems, from the telegraph
forward, commented on how the epistemology (way of knowing) of medium changed the
way individuals related to the “imagined communities” outside of their immediate
experience and how they fitted into a newly integrated whole. Mass communications, as
Carey put it, “allowed individuals to be linked, for the first time, directly to a national
community without the mediating influence of regional and other local affiliations.”177
This observation was not unique to Carey, but sometimes-obvious points must be made.
In Carey’s view, a national consciousness in an individual was best conceived as a
ritualistic process more akin to a religion rather than the byproduct of political
economy;178 but it was these ritualistic processes that were made possible by the material
forces of technology that overcame geographic boundaries and shaped the language and
style of messages communicated. Carey’s analysis of communication as it related to
national consciousness, then, contained a structural analysis of social organization
characteristic of Innis and an analysis of the effects of a medium on individual
consciousness characteristic of those like McLuhan, Eisenstein, and Anderson.
Carey’s synthesis of thinkers like Innis and McLuhan produced his multi-pronged
approach to studying the changes made by the telegraph in the mid-nineteenth century.
Much like Innis’ work on technological change, Carey focused first on the economic and

177

Carey, “The Communications Revolution and the Professional Communicator,” in James Carey: A
Critical Reader, 129.
178

Carey, “Afterword,” 312.

84

political impact of the telegraph and then moved on to its more psychic effects on
language use and style. For example, in terms of its economic impact, the telegraph broke
up the early forms of capitalist “city-states” in the U.S. (that is, urban industrial centers)
and altered the ways they were managed before the telegraph’s separation of
transportation from communication.179 The development of national communications
networks in the United States, of which the telegraph and the railroad were the
cornerstone, centralized business interests by finally linking together and coordinating
large and geographically divided industries. As a result, business relationships became
impersonal as pre-telegraph modes of personal business correspondence faded as the
speed of transactions increased and were made more standardized.180
On a more general economic level, the telegraph had the effect of altering the
forms of American capitalism in terms of its operation and organization. Carey pointed
out that a new body of law and political organization became necessary to accommodate
the new ecology of communications and transportation coordinated by the telegraph and
the railroad.181 Note here that in Carey’s analysis of state, capitalist, and imperial
transformations, he did not draw explicit boundaries as to the effects of the telegraph on
those of private power and those of the state. This is because the rise of modern forms of
industrial capitalism could not have occurred without the nation-state and its desire for
the expansion and preservation of its power. Capitalism, in other words, rose in tandem
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with the state as the existence of one necessitated the existence of the other;182 thus, the
telegraph merely expanded the already existing space bias of American state-capitalist
development.
At the individual level, Carey argued, local concerns were displaced by national
ones with the spatial conquests of a national network of communications established first
by the telegraph and then extended by film, radio, and television.183 Carey noted how the
telegraph demanded a style of communication that stripped language of all local
colloquial habits so that messages were uniform and standardized for the smooth
transmission of messages from coast to coast. This disciplining of language by the
telegraph changed the nature of journalism and created the well known from of “cablese,”
a style of reporting stripped of all linguistic adornment. This style of analysis, attentive to
the linguistic impact of the medium, was indebted most clearly to McLuhan, although
Carey did not share the same technologically deterministic tendencies characteristic of
McLuhan.184
Carey’s analysis of the effects of the telegraph on American society were thus a
mixture of both economic materialism and philosophical idealism insofar as he examined
both material and non-material aspects of the consequences of technological change.
Carey managed to avoid the hard forms of technological determinism more characteristic
of thinkers like Innis and McLuhan. This is more true of his later work on technology
than of his earlier work with John Quirk, which contained, at times, deterministic
language inherited from Innis. By the 1990s, Carey was careful not to reduce cultural
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changes to purely economic terms or technological change, a charge that he leveled at
Marxist-inspired cultural critiques and at McLuhan.
Carey appreciated the chaos and complexity of the social world in a way that
widened his view of technological change and, like a good pragmatist, avoided the search
for any philosophical system in which to examine it. Therefore, G. Stuart Adams’
comment that “Carey’s [philosophical] system is complex” is simply nonsensical flattery,
because Carey was not a systematic philosophical thinker but simply a very engaged
social critic.185 Therefore, it can be argued that some of Carey’s most important work was
his more explicitly moralistic analysis of technology and ideology, work that sought to
counter the contemporary advocates of the “technological sublime” who believe that
technology will solve the major problems of society in all realms both technical and
cultural.
“Technology and Ideology”
The most interesting aspects of human communication for Carey were its
ritualistic forms; in Carey’s framework, rituals were essential to a culture’s replication
and continuation. So to read Carey’s critique of communications technology is to
encounter a sense of loss and frustration as Carey’s “transmission view” of
communication represented the encroachment of secular, national, and monopolistic
interests on more authentic forms of cultural life, ritual, and democratic practice. For
Carey, American culture contained an ideological notion of unlimited progress and
“manifest destiny”, and this ideological stance was manifested in the physical
embodiment of the “space biased” communications systems – these were extensions of
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ideas that he inherited from Innis. But unlike Innis, who was a writer that searched for
explanations for the imperial aspects of his own civilization by looking at the economic
and communications systems of civilizations in the past,186 for the most part, Carey
focused instead on his own civilization with an eye towards its history and culture. Carey
held the view that the U.S. was unique from other nations ideologically, geographically,
and politically. For Carey, the U.S. was especially afflicted by the ideological
presupposition towards technology as a self-perpetuating mode of technological progress,
another component of his transmission view of communications.187
Carey’s exploration of the tension between the more ritualistic forms of
communal life and modernity is a well-trod area of criticism. Technological criticism
itself is indeed its own literary genre. One of the most well-known examples, albeit one
of the most pessimistic, can be found in the French intellectual and lay theologian Jacque
Ellul’s The Technological Society, a book that contains much lamentation about the
encroachment of technology and modern technique on moral and spiritual life.188 Lewis
Mumford’s The Myth of the Machine gave us similar gloomy prospects for the future
based on his analysis of the overall trends of technological epochs throughout history.189
Such technological criticism, including Carey’s, focused its attention on issues of
technology and morality—how technology shapes human behavior and organization, how
a technology changes the way a society views itself and its goals, and finally, how it
changes the metaphors a society uses to understand the world.
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The introduction of the telegraph, for example, represented for Carey a
technological change that had displaced older religious views of communication and
replaced them with more secular views parallel with the interests of capital and
centralized power. He once commented that “an essentially religious view of
communication - or one cloaked, at least, in religious metaphors - is a mediator - a
progressively vanishing mediator between middle-class aspiration and capitalist and,
increasingly, imperial development.”190 Such was his articulation of the boundary
between the sacred and the secular, a boundary eroded by the encroachment of a new
electronic “knowledge monopoly.”
The best examples of Carey’s technological criticism were of course his essays
written with his enigmatic student, John Quirk. Carey and Quirk’s work in this area
stands as some of Carey’s most moralistic and didactic essays from a scholar who was
known for his intellectual level-headedness. The type of criticism that Carey leveled
against what he and John Quirk called the promise of the “technological sublime” was
some of his most radical criticism of the culturally resonant notion of natural
technological progression. Carey and Quirk taught their readers that technology should be
viewed with skepticism as it always comes loaded with ideological presuppositions,
unexpected consequences, and outcomes that benefit some in society at the cost of others.
The type of social research that Carey and Quirk engaged in sought to confront this myth
of coming technological utopia, not, incidentally, to add to the prestige of their discipline
or discover anything new. There is indeed nothing new in Carey and Quirk’s critique of
“mythos of the electronic revolution”; their points had been made before and will mostly
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likely be made again. To this point, it is hard to resist quoting Neil Postman on this type
of social research:
Like moral theology, social research never discovers anything. It only rediscovers
what people were once told and need to be told again. If, indeed, the price of
civilization is repressed sexuality, it was not Sigmund Freud who discovered it. If
the consciousness of the people is formed by their material circumstances, it was
not Marx who discovered it. If the medium is the message it was not McLuhan
who discovered it. The purpose of social research is to rediscover the truths of
social life; to comment on and criticize the moral behavior of people; and finally,
to put forward metaphors, images, and ideas that can help people live with some
measure of understanding and dignity.191
It is not difficult to find the same type of criticism in Carey and Quirk’s observations
about the American ideology of technology written by writers that came before them. For
instance, Alexis de Tocqueville noticed Americans’ peculiar notions about the
possibilities of new techniques and technologies when he set about to explain American
democracy to his European peers in 1835:
“[t]he American lives in a land of wonders; everything around him is in constant
is in constant movement, and every movement seems an advance. Consequently,
in his mind the idea of newness is closely linked with that of improvement.
Nowhere does he see any limit placed by nature to human endeavor; in his eyes
something that does not exist is just something that has not been tried…Choose
any American at random, and he should be a man of burning desires, enterprising,
adventurous, and, above all, an innovator.”192
Carey and Quirk’s essay, “The Mythos of the Electronic Revolution,” explored this
aspect of the American character in more depth. In this essay, Carey and Quirk
researched the work of a wide array of writers whose optimism for the future produced a
quasi-religious faith in a coming electric utopia. One such example of this temperament
was the nineteenth century economist Henry Charles Clay, who saw in the promise of
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technology a way around the industrial nightmares of European wage slavery and
environmental pollution.193 In their essay, Carey and Quirk took it upon themselves to
“demythologize” such utopian rhetoric, and they used Innis’ notion of medium bias as an
analytic tool to do so. Using more deterministic language, Carey and Quirk condemned
all future intellectual endeavors towards the elaboration of proper technological
application as inadequate because such attempts did not take into account the inherent
“bias” of these technologies against “dispersed use and small-scale control.”194 This is
because for Carey and Quirk, the space bias of electronic technologies would only build
on the on the centralized, commercial, and national interests that previous technologies
like the telegraph had expanded.
Yet, as is the case with many social critics, Carey and Quirk were armed with
more problems than they had answers. Consider the following comments:
Modern media of communications have, however, a common effect: they widen
the range of reception while narrowing the range of distribution. Large audiences
receive but are unable to make direct response or participate otherwise in vigorous
discussion. Consequently, modern media create the potential for the simultaneous
administration and control of extraordinary spaces and populations. No amount of
rhetoric will exorcise this effect. The bias of technology can be controlled only by
politics, by curtailing the expansionist tendencies of technological societies and
by creating avenues of democratic discussion and participation beyond the control
of modern technology. 195
Carey favored of communication that is in a more literal sense communal; one can see
this in Carey and Quirk’s wish for the creation of “avenues of democratic discussion”
with an emphasis on discussion as the correct mode of communication for democratic
practice. They wished for a new form of information environment to counter the
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detrimental effects of electronic communications. But there was, of course, a problem.
Because Carey and Quirk stressed the inherent bias of modern communications for social
control, it is difficult to discern whether they believed that any form of electronic
communication could be so conceived as to not emphasize any culturally imperial
tendencies. Just because a technology has not been designed to increase democratic social
tendencies does that mean that such technologies cannot be so designed (or so used).
While it may be conceded that medium bias is at issue when it comes to communications,
the authors did not mention in any detail the type of politics that might overcome
technological bias towards anti-democratic practices and social control besides
encouraging more discussion. Additionally, the possibility of avoiding the “control of
modern technology” or rather the use of technology seems impossible in the
contemporary United States, and the reader is left frustrated by an impossible situation, as
the effects of modernity and mechanization are both ubiquitous and unavoidable.
The Non-Neutrality of Technology
Paul Goodman once noted that “[w]hether or not it draws on new scientific
research, technology is a branch of moral philosophy, not of science.”196 Carey took this
insight even further when he commented that “[t]echnology, as a character in the
American social drama, acts as a higher authority adjudicating claims of both truth and
morality. As I have said elsewhere, in America it is the machines that possess teleological
insight.”197 One may counter that such conclusions are overdrawn, but consider that the
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mere existence of computers has vastly altered the metaphors in which we describe the
human brain as something that can be “programmed” or “deprogrammed.” The computer
has altered the way we conceive of human cognition such that humans are conceived as
“thinking machines,” a conception that signals our altered perception of human
consciousness. The brain is of course not a computer, and the use of a computer metaphor
places limits on our understanding of the mind/brain interface just as all metaphors shape
our understanding of the things they describe.
Over time, Carey’s stance evolved and he came to point out that technology was a
physical embodiment of ideological propositions, moving away from some of Innis’ more
technologically deterministic theoretical positions. Carey was always much more hesitant
than Innis to grant technological forms and institutions the causal status that they seemed
to have in Innis’ historical interpretations and his technological criticism became
progressively more nuanced. By the 1990s, Carey viewed technology as a purely cultural
phenomenon with a dialectical and reciprocal relationship to its users. For example, in
1997, Carey claimed that:
To view technology as thoroughly cultural is an attempt to escape, rather than
reproduce, the endless and unproductive arguments surrounding technological
determinism. From a cultural viewpoint, technological artifacts are understood, at
least in a provisional and hypothetical way, as homunculi: concrete embodiments
of human purposes, social relations and forms of organization. Certain
technologies imaginatively constitute, express, and compress into themselves the
dominant features of the surrounding social world. A homunculus is a society writ
small. It is also a human person writ small insofar as it serves not merely as a
template or producing social relations but as a template for producing human
nature as well.198
This language was a much softer form of rhetoric than Carey had used in 1970 in that it
was analytically a much softer technological deterministic stance. The bias of technology
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for Carey here was simply a matter of what the form of a technology embodied as
inherited from its surrounding culture.
Yet Carey never abandoned the notion of the “non-neutrality of technology” to
borrow language again from Neil Postman. Technology is the means that people use to
alter their world, and it is a form of technique and little more. While this is no doubt true,
anyone who has heard the cliché “to the man with a hammer, the world appears as full of
nails” and nodded approvingly has a basic grasp of the type of analysis that one finds in
Carey’s meditation on the telegraph and of communication technology in general. The
simple fact is that the material form that a technology takes has a significant impact on
the uses to which it is put and the requirements it demands of its users. Atomic power
plants, for example, require for their maintenance a hierarchal system of management
equipped to respond quickly to a meltdown; in other words, its form limits its
organizational possibilities and favors non-democratic over more democratic structures.
Arguments over the causal factors of the hierarchical form that the atomic power plant
encourages would be tedious, and perhaps unproductive, but the fact remains that its
material form effects its organization and social impact––it is therefore not a neutral form
of technology. This is a form of analytically soft-technological determinism that is useful
so long as it does not obliterate the possibility for an alternative and leave its readers in a
state of despair.
Therefore it is safe to call Carey’s technological criticism a soft-form of
determinism (as opposed to hard determinism—that is, he did not view technology as an
independent and neutral driver of human society). What we can take from Carey and
others in these matters is that the structure of a technology influences the uses to which it
is put and that it can have unexpected consequences. This type of criticism is necessary in
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culture that is at many times oblivious to the material consequences that a technology has
and becomes even more necessary as technological advances occur more quickly than a
culture has time to keep up with its impact. The iconoclastic analysis of Carey and Quirk,
and others, remind us that change comes with both positive and negative consequences;
and also that we should look to the changes of the past in order to assess the
technological hyperboles of today. What is gained from reading such technological
criticism is the reminder that our situation is never so far removed from the past as we
think.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
In March of 1974, Marshall McLuhan wrote a short letter to Carey in response to
Carey’s essay with John Quirk, “The Mythos of the Electronic Revolution.” McLuhan
was responding to Carey’s reading of him as a technological utopian, which he felt
missed the nuances of his work. In his concluding remarks, however, McLuhan
applauded Carey’s efforts and wrote, “[y]ou are familiar with academic timidity and
respectability. You are taking your academic life in your hands when you write about
Innis and McLuhan. You must be a fearless character.”199 McLuhan had a point: Carey
was willing to take chances in his academic career, but the greatest chances Carey took
were not with his essays on McLuhan and Innis. This fearlessness, if we may call it that,
came from Carey’s willingness to have a constant and critical dialogue with the
institutions in which he lived his life.
Upon his death in 2006, Carey’s son Daniel Carey, now a professor of English
literature, commented on the dialogic and critical nature of his father’s work. Daniel
Carey pointed out that his father’s scholarship was intimately related to his role as both
teacher and administrator. Carey’s unique outlook, in that he was able to step outside of
his role as a university professor and comment on the university from the point of view of
an outsider, was connected to his personal biography. As discussed in the introduction,
because of his congenital heart defect, he received little formal education before his mid199
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teens. When he became old enough to attend college, Carey lacked the credits to pursue a
degree in a topic that interested him, such as philosophy or history, so he began his
college education with the aim of becoming qualified for office work; he thought that he
was not healthy enough for factory work or the military. So Carey’s undergraduate
education at the University of Rhode Island consisted of classes in business and
economics. After he finished his degree in business, Carey went on to the University of
Illinois to get a master’s in advertising with the expectation of entering the business
world. It was only after finishing his master’s degree that Carey decided to pursue the
Ph.D.200
A combination of circumstance and chance led to Carey’s entry into academia. In
addition to his hard work and intelligence, the increase in journalism and
communications programs in the postwar period presented many opportunities to the
young Carey. Carey benefited greatly from the expansion of the American university
system during the Cold War that is only now beginning to recede. Shortly after finishing
his Ph.D., he was able to become a full professor at the University of Illinois at age 28.
Carey found himself teaching in a field that valued professional experience in journalism
or advertising, when, of course, he had none. Carey, in essence, began his career as an
academic as a relative outsider, but one whose talent could not be denied. Because of his
unique background and temperament, Carey came to be one of the most eloquent critics
of the positivism and behaviorism in his field because he was able to think both within
and outside of his position.201
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The major intellectual antagonist that Carey fought against was, of course, the
“effects tradition” in mass communications and positivism in the social sciences. Unlike
critical theorists such as Theodore Adorno or Jürgen Habermas, who simply dismissed
positivist social science for reducing large problems of political philosophy and society to
abstract formulas, Carey confronted positivism head on. This confrontation was born of
necessity; it was simply impossible for Carey to dismiss an academic tendency that
surrounded him in order to make room for his style of inquiry derived from the
humanities. In order to carve out a space for himself and others, Carey first had to deal
with the “effects tradition” and explain why an alternative approach was necessary.
So Carey’s alternative path became his unique form of cultural studies. In a
review of his book Communication as Culture, Kenneth Cmiel aptly pointed out that
Carey’s project of cultural studies was a rather explicit reconstruction of American
liberalism that steered between the lines of critical social science and behaviorism.202
Carey was a type of pre-modernist who wanted to reconstruct, or at least make visible,
older forms of communication that for him embodied a more authentic form of
community and democratic discourse. Face-to-face interaction, conversation, community,
and dialogue were the backbone of his explicitly liberal politics that sought to restore the
“public” to the status of participant rather than passive observer. Walter Lippmann was
thus his natural enemy. Lippmann viewed the public as simply incapable of managing
their own opinions in an increasingly complex world; the role of the expert was to
manage, with the aid of technical skill and science, the “bewildered herd.”203 As Carey
202

Kenneth Cmiel, “Book Reviews: Communication as Culture, by James W. Carey,” Theory and Society
21, no. 2 (1992): 285-290.
203

This rather harsh phrase was coined, of course, by Lippmann who wrote, “[t]he public must be put in its
place so it may exercise its own powers, but no less, and perhaps even more so that each of us may live free

98

put it, Lippmann conceived of the public as “the objects rather than the subjects of
politics.”204
Carey’s project of cultural studies drew from cultural anthropology and the
Chicago School of Sociology’s symbolic interactionism with an implicit goal of placing
the public back into view. His goal was to raise the status of the communal ritual and the
sharing and creation of symbols and to advocate an anthropological approach to interpret
these processes. Max Weber’s verstehen method and Clifford Geertz’s interpretive
ethnographies, among other projects, provided the inspiration for a way forward in
research and an embodiment of his liberalism. In Carey’s tradition, the public was no
longer solely a subject to be assessed as to the effects that media had on it; rather, it was
an active public with agency and intelligence that academics should seek to understand.
But there was a weakness in his theoretical point of view. Carey’s veneration for
ritual and community, partly inherited from Dewey, pushed into the background
institutional forces, strong ones in fact, in which communities and rituals were enmeshed.
Partly because he was distasteful of polemic, and partly because his early experiences
with Marxism made him skeptical of research driven by adversarial politics, Carey
avoided looking for the structural forces in the national media that shaped the
conversation on the front end. Thus, Carey could seem hopelessly old-fashioned, a
friendly and nostalgic old man who wished for the return of a communal existence that
was not going to return. At worst, he appeared as someone completely oblivious to the
major issues of asymmetrical power relations in his society. At best, he appeared as
of the trampling and the roar of the bewildered herd.” Quoted in Barry D. Riccio, Walter Lippmann:
Odyssey of a Liberal (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1996), 70.
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someone who simply avoided them. Even rituals can serve as a means to control others;
American forms of consumerism, nationalism, and militarism all have their associated
rituals. Carey’s avoidance of these issues was the major flaw in his thought.
Nevertheless, one can take inspiration from the democratic conversations and
community that Carey held so dearly. Even Robert McChesney, in his criticism that a
cultural studies that ostensibly avoids the neoliberal forces that are attacking the authentic
forms of community it cherishes, acknowledged implicitly that such things are valuable
and need protecting. Even if one dismisses Carey as a quixotic dreamer, a man who
wished for a world that was long since past––if it even existed to begin with––there is
still a sense of optimism in Carey’s work that those working in critical theory might learn
from. Critical theory and some forms of neo-Marxist analysis of culture risk burying the
public in an impossible situation from which they cannot escape. Carey’s democratic
liberalism at least offers a glimpse of a possible form of salvation. Forging new
communities and face-to-face communications with one’s neighbors are still the most
powerful forms of political practice––Twitter notwithstanding. Protests and
demonstrations of the Occupy Movement and other social justice movements draw much
of their power from the fact that they are able to bring people together communally in a
single space; Carey, had he lived to see the Occupy Movement, would have understood
this. Carey’s vision needed more critical theory, and critical theory needs a bit more of
Carey’s optimism. A combination of these two views would lead to a better
understanding of communications, politics, media, and culture.205
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Carey’s technological criticism was not, as some might assume, explicitly
connected to his writings on cultural studies and his critiques of positivism. There were
no grand philosophical systems implicit in his work. Carey’s work on technology owed to
his fascination with the work of Harold Innis, who for Carey exemplified the high point
of a study of communications in North America. Carey’s work on Innis stands second to
none; a casual glance of the secondary literature on Innis will attest to this fact. In the
literature on Innis, the name James W. Carey abounds. I have argued that Carey’s work in
technological criticism stands on the theoretical foundation that Innis produced.
Although, Carey did not follow Innis into the harder forms of technological determinism
that Innis often embraced, Carey’s theories were a form of soft determinism in that he
accepted tentatively the inherent bias of communications technologies from the telegraph
to the computer. He held that such bias had real effects on literacy and even how people
think. It is the position of this thesis that these forms of analysis are useful insofar as they
are not overstated; the relationship to one’s tools may be reciprocal, but they never
necessarily determine human thought and action. Technology can be used many
purposes, and it is the realms of culture and politics are the most determining factors of a
technology’s use, yet, the physical forms of a technology are nevertheless important and
worth examining.
Most importantly, perhaps, throughout his career Carey remained committed to
the idea that technological change has thus far only maintained the existing forms of
social stratification rather than disturb them. In this thesis, I have attempted to show that
these observations were Carey’s most important contributions to our understanding of
these issues. That is, for Carey, technology could not solve problems that are intrinsic to
politics and culture. This observation was not new; indeed, other writers had said it many
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times before in many different ways, but that makes it no less important. In this thesis, I
have attempted to show that Carey’s most important messages were those that his readers
already knew, but as Neil Postman observed they needed to be told again. It was in this
way that Carey embodied the best of the public intellectual.
Carey’s observations about the culture’s technological utopianism with John
Quirk were powerful social critiques, but they were again all too blind to the institutional
conditions within which technology is produced. Nevertheless, Carey’s soft-determinism,
his focusing on the outcomes that the forms of a technology produce, suggests a fact that
is not readily acknowledged: technology can have both positive and negative outcomes. I
agree with Lance Strate that Carey veered into the realm of “media ecology,” Neil
Postman’s name for the study of information environments. This turn put his work
alongside the likes of Elizabeth Eisenstein, Harold Innis, Marshall McLuhan, Walter
Ong, and others who paid close attention to the subliminal ways that media affect how
information is both presented and consumed and who critiqued the cultural effects of
communications technology.206
An implicit question in this project has been, "Why ought one read James
Carey?” The answer lies in the admirable democratic ethos that underlies all of his work.
James Carey was deeply attuned to the tensions between his institutional role as an
academic and the greater society of which he was a part; that is to say, his work was
engaged with what it meant to be both investigator and participant in the culture that was
his object of study. In Carey’s words, “[w]e are not just neutral observers of cultural
texts. Rather they confront us with claims and arguments about truth and rightness to
206
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which we must assent or dissent.”207 The point here is that Carey wanted to make clear
that there is no real position of objectivity that can be taken in social inquiry; there is no
neutrality when one is faced with social questions because there is no way to remove
oneself from the culture. Instead, there are professional ideals for objectivity, ideals that
must be strived for, but nonetheless they remain ideals.
Positivist social research must pretend that it can detach itself from the society
that it studies in order to reach objective conclusions, even though this is impossible.
Carey disliked positivist social research because he viewed it as antidemocratic and
believed it implied that social knowledge is accessible only to those with the proper
training. This impulse in Carey––a distrust of experts and a combative attitude towards
those detached and morally disengaged forms of professionalism––was not mere
populism but his adherence to a profound democratic ethos. A democratic ethos means
paying very close, constant, and even painful attention to what one is doing and one's
motivations for doing it. Carey understood that his work was both an analysis and
product of the American culture that surrounded him and was honest about it. He
embodied this democratic ethos in his work and life, and if for no other reason, this is
why we should remember his example.
Carey’s type of communications research may seem to some overly literary and
philosophical, doomed from the start to failing Karl Popper’s test of falsifiability. But to
come to such a conclusion would be a mistake. Carey’s type of thinking was original;
there are few scholars who have reached across disciplinary boundaries with such a keen
eye and productive synthesis. Carey offered no strict methodological process for studying
the media, but instead provided an example of the values and attributes that a researcher
207
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should embody. That is, to study the media requires a strong curiosity, keen perception of
detail, and an ability to order the enormous amount of complexity that confronts any
communications researcher. Carey’s scholarship was not without its flaws, but it engages
its readers in conversations about media and scholarship that should never truly end. In
this way, his contribution to scholarship was significant because the questions he left us
have no final answers, as is the case with most truly important questions. It is up to us to
continue the conversation.
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